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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE PRESSURE ON  
CFO JUDGMENTS 
by 
Carol C. Bishop 
Through an experiment, this study examines the influence of social influence 
pressure on the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO’s) financial reporting decisions. 
Specifically, I evaluate the impact of inappropriate obedience and compliance pressure 
from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on the CFO’s propensity to make revisions to 
financial results in order to meet an earnings target. This study also examines how 
followership propensities and core self-evaluations (CSE) influence the pressure effects. 
This study complements and expands archival research examining why CFOs appear to 
participate in material accounting manipulations (Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin, 2011; Ge, 
Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2011). 
The results of a between-subject experiment with 66 public company CFOs 
indicate that obedience and compliance pressure significantly increase CFOs’ willingness 
to revise their initial inventory adjustments in the direction preferred by the CEO. 
Although compliance pressure did not create perceived pressure in the CFOs, it generated 
an actual response (similar revision of the initial adjustment) similar to that under 
obedience pressure. Compliance pressure’s strength reveals that CEO power is effective 
even when soft tactics (i.e., requests) are utilized. The findings confirm the importance of 
	  
vii 
the “tone at the top” in financial statement judgments. In addition, the findings reveal that 
effective followers, who independently evaluate leadership’s requests, were less likely to 
revise their initial adjustment. Finally, CFOs with more accounting experience were less 
likely to revise their initial adjustment. This study has implications for corporate 
governance mechanisms, including improving the effectiveness of CFOs as financial 
statement monitors and improving CFO independence to alleviate pressure from the 
CEO.  
 
Keywords:  financial statement fraud, material accounting misstatement, obedience 
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Instead of viewing followers as the ‘good soldiers’ who carry  
out commands dutifully, we need to view followers as the primary 
defenders against toxic leaders or dysfunctional organizations.  
The buck stops more with followers than leaders (Kelley, 2008, 14). 
  
 This study examines the effect of social influence pressure on the Chief Financial 
Officer’s (CFO’s) financial reporting decisions. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of 
inappropriate obedience and compliance pressure from the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) on the CFO’s propensity to revise financial results. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, 
and Neal (2010) call for research examining the behavioral factors motivating CFOs to 
engage in fraudulent misreporting using leadership and organizational behavior research. 
This study complements and expands archival research by examining why CFOs appear 
to participate in material accounting manipulations (Feng et al., 2011; Ge, Matsumoto, & 
Zhang, 2011).  
 This study also examines how followership propensities and core self-evaluations 
(CSE) influence the pressure effects. Followership theory (Kelley, 1992) classifies 
followers based on their degree of independence and activity, and offers a framework for 
understanding CFO follower behavior (Amernic & Craig, 2010). CSE is composed of 
self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and emotional stability (Judge, Locke, & 
Durham, 1997). CSE influences behavior in reaction to organizational social stressors 
(Bono & Judge, 2003; Harris, Harvey, & Kacmar, 2009).	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Financial statement misreporting is a form of aggressive accounting, which, in the 
extreme, reaches the level of financial statement fraud. Fraud schemes involve the 
intentional misstatement or omission of material information in the organization’s 
financial reports, including recording fictitious revenues, concealing liabilities or 
expenses, and artificially inflating assets (ACFE, 2010). Motivations for manipulating the 
financial reports of publicly owned companies are numerous, including financial rewards, 
company survival, excessive executive egos, and meeting growth strategies. As a result, 
prior literature has investigated the likelihood of committing financial statement fraud 
from diverse perspectives, including criminology (Bucy, Formby, Raspanti, & Rooney, 
2008), sociology/psychology (Ramamoorti, 2008), moral reasoning (Maroney & 
McDevitt, 2008), and ethics (Shafer, 2002).  
 Academic accounting literature has focused considerable attention on the “fraud 
triangle” as a tool for investigating the root causes of fraud from a psychological 
perspective. The fraud triangle posits that three conditions are generally present when 
fraud occurs: (1) an incentive or pressure, (2) an opportunity, and (3) rationalization or 
attitude (Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, & Velury, 2008; Loebbecke, Eining, & Willingham, 
1989). Likewise, accounting professionals feature the fraud triangle in their efforts to 
detect fraud in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002). By separately evaluating each element of 
the fraud triangle, auditors increase their effectiveness in making an overall fraud risk 
assessment as a result of being more sensitive to opportunity and incentive clues (Wilks 
& Zimbelman, 2004).  
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 Financial statement fraud is carried out by individuals who are either morally 
inclined to commit fraud or individuals who set aside their moral convictions as a result 
of pressure or incentives and then rationalize their decision. Thus, financial statement 
fraud is at its core an individual decision. Due to its nature, financial statement fraud is 
primarily planned and carried out by members of the top management team. In fact, the 
SEC named the CEO and/or CFO for some level of involvement in 89 percent of 
accounting fraud cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1998-
2007 (Beasley et al., 2010), with the CEO named in 72 percent of the cases and the CFO 
in 65 percent. As head of the top management team (TMT), most corporate reporting 
fraud schemes necessarily originate from the CEO’s actions or attitudes (Anderson & 
Tirrell, 2004) because CEOs are responsible for the organization’s “tone at the top.” 
CEOs can provide incentives and pressure to induce fraudulent behavior by other TMT 
members. 
CEOs have significant influence over fraudulent financial reporting, including all 
three areas of the fraud triangle. However, their opportunity to directly commit fraud is 
partially constrained since they do not have hands-on access to financial records. As a 
result, CEOs typically need assistance from CFOs to carry out their intentions. Entrusted 
with primary responsibility over financial statement preparation, CFOs play a pivotal role 
in determining the quality of financial reporting (Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, & Lee, 2005). 
CFOs also maintain internal controls and implement accounting principles and 
procedures. The importance of the CFO’s fiduciary duties is evidenced by the 
requirement in Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that CFOs (along with 
CEOs) certify and approve the integrity of their company’s financial statements. 
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Archival evidence (Beasley et al., 2010) indicates that both CEOs and CFOs are 
the primary individuals implicated in financial statement fraud. Research also suggests 
that CEO and CFO equity incentives significantly influence earnings management 
activities and the likelihood of beating analysts’ forecasts (Jiang, Petroni, & Wang, 
2010). CEOs occupy higher positions of power in the organization in comparison to 
CFOs and, as a result, have the ability to influence the compensation, job security, and 
future career opportunities of the CFO. In contrast, CFOs have primary responsibility and 
influence over financial reporting. Thus, differences in CEO and CFO power and job 
responsibilities suggest differences in motivations, rationales, and decision making in the 
area of financial statement misreporting. In fact, Feng et al. (2011) find archival evidence 
suggesting that CFOs are more likely to commit financial statement fraud in response to 
perceived pressure from CEOs rather than for their own personal financial benefit. They 
find higher CEO equity incentives and power in firms with material accounting 
manipulations as compared to matched non-manipulation firms, but no difference in CFO 
equity incentives across the two types of firms.        
 I use two types of social influence pressure to examine, in an experimental 
setting, the extent to which CEO pressure is a motivating factor for CFOs to revise the 
financial statements, which may be a first step toward committing financial statement 
fraud (Beasley et al., 2010, finds that many frauds start small and become larger over 
time). Obedience pressure and compliance pressure involve pressure from superiors. 
Under these pressures, the supervisor’s influence comes in the form of either a directive 
(obedience pressure) or a request (compliance pressure) to engage in an act. 
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According to obedience theory, individuals who succumb to pressure (i.e., direct 
orders) from a superior rationalize their fraudulent behavior by placing full responsibility 
for the fraud on the authority figure (Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006). By rationalizing 
that they had no choice but to follow a superior’s orders, they are able to reduce the stress 
they might otherwise feel from engaging in unethical, immoral, or illegal behavior 
conflicting with their individual values. Under obedience pressure, subordinate 
individuals break from an autonomous state, become an agent for the authoritative 
source, and deny responsibility (Milgram, 1963). Thus, obedience pressure links two 
areas of the fraud triangle: pressure and rationalization. 
 Compliance pressure refers to an individual’s acquiescence in response to an 
explicit or implicit request (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) from either a peer or superior 
(DeZoort & Lord, 1997). Target individuals may have various underlying reasons for 
accepting or adopting the influence of others, including gaining rewards or approval and 
avoiding punishment or disapproval. 
I explore the judgments of practicing CFOs in an experimental setting and 
measure behavioral factors motivating their decisions. The experimental setting is 
advantageous because motivations influencing the decisions of participants can be 
evaluated directly using unobservable personality characteristics rather than indirectly 
using observable proxies such as demographic characteristics (as is commonly done in 
previous archival research). The use of practicing CFOs is advantageous because an 
actual management manipulation decision can be evaluated directly in a case study rather 
than indirectly using observable proxies such as accounting financial statement variables 
typically used in archival research. Further, the use of practicing CFOs responds to the 
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call for incorporating management, given its significant influence, into governance 
studies (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004). 
The use of behavioral factors is advantageous because it is an attempt to directly look at 
the psychological factors driving executive manipulation behavior and determining 
managers’ style differences (Ge et al., 2011) rather than indirectly examining the inputs 
and outputs of the “black box” (Hambrick, 2007). Thus, this paper attempts to expand the 
theories (psychology) and research methods (experimental) typically used to understand 
the important problem of financial statement manipulation, as suggested by Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Ye (2011).  
In this study, current CFOs participated in an experiment involving a hypothetical 
CFO’s earnings manipulation decision. Using a between-subjects manipulation, I used 
three levels of CEO pressure (obedience pressure from a CEO who tells the CFO to 
revise an estimate, compliance pressure from a CEO who asks the CFO to revise an 
estimate, and a control group where the CEO does not pressure the CFO). Additionally, I 
measured personality variables (followership and core self-evaluations) for potential 
moderating effects. The dependent variable was the participant’s propensity to revise an 
inventory adjustment decision. 
 The results indicate that obedience and compliance pressure significantly increase 
CFOs’ willingness to revise their inventory adjustments. Additionally, obedience and 
compliance pressure produce similar CFO responses (i.e., revisions to meet the earnings 
target) despite differences in the CFOs’ perception of the degree of pressure inherent in 
the demand or request. The findings confirm the importance of  “tone at the top” and of 
corporate culture surrounding earnings targets in financial statement judgments. The 
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predictions for responsibility assessments, that CFOs who succumbed to CEO pressure 
would assign responsibility for their decision to the CEO, were not supported. Instead, 
CFOs under pressure assigned primary responsibility for their decision to themselves and 
provided qualitative evidence of their sense of responsibility for financial statement 
decisions. Overall, CFOs found a revision of the estimate to be legal and neither ethical 
or unethical. However, the CFOs who did not revise their estimate judged such a change 
to be significantly more illegal and unethical than CFOs who did revise.  
The hypothesized effect for followership (moderating the effect of pressure) was 
not found. However, I did find that effective followers, who independently evaluate 
leadership’s requests, were less likely to revise their adjustment. The findings did not 
support the prediction for CSE; the participants’ levels of CSE did not influence their 
resistance to pressure or their propensity to revise their adjustment. Finally, CPAs with 
more accounting experience were less likely to revise their initial adjustments. This study 
has implications for corporate governance mechanisms, including improving the 
effectiveness of CFOs as financial statement monitors and improving CFO independence 
to alleviate pressure from the CEO.  
This paper enhances the study of social influence effects by using followership 
theory to investigate how CFO behavior is influenced by individual factors such as 
personality and passive/proactive followership schema. Additionally, followership may 
enrich our understanding of how CFOs as followers can fulfill an ethical watchdog role 
(Kelley, 1998) and contribute to corporate governance. By encouraging thoughtful 
dissent, organizations are more likely to achieve better decisions (Bennis, 2010) and 
potentially reduce fraud. A review of the accounting literature indicates that the construct 
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of followership has not yet been empirically tested in an accounting context. This paper’s 
investigation of followership propensities will lay the groundwork for future research into 
accounting practitioner followership propensities. 
 Additionally, this paper extends the study of psychological characteristics 
influencing CFO decision-making by examining the influence of core self-evaluations 
(CSE) on an earnings manipulation decision. CSE is a higher-order personality construct 
composed of at least four specific traits: self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and 
emotional stability (Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). This dispositional trait 
subconsciously influences individual perceptions and behavior (Bono & Judge, 2003) and 
moderates individual reactions to organizational social stressors (Harris, Harvey, & 
Kacmar, 2009). 
In summary, this research is expected to improve our understanding of the factors 
ultimately contributing to an individual’s decision to set aside personal beliefs and 
engage in fraud (although the current study examines a softer setting than outright fraud), 
including the attitudes and rationalizations that result in the decision to engage in 
fraudulent misreporting, and the psyche of individuals involved in fraudulent reporting 
(Beasley et al., 2010). Additionally, this research has implications for potential 
improvements in the effectiveness of CFOs as financial statement monitors by exploring 
thoughtful dissent. Lastly, this research extends corporate governance research on CFOs 
and provides support for the need to improve CFO independence to alleviate 
inappropriate pressure from the CEO.  
The next sections provide background information and develop the hypotheses. 







LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 As noted above, SEC fraud-related enforcement cases typically cite the CEO 
and/or CFO for some level of involvement in the misreporting (Beasley et al., 2010). 
Considerable research has investigated top management team fraud resulting from 
financial incentives from bonuses or equity-based compensation (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, 
& Larcker, 2010; Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007). However, 
the motives, pressures, and incentives of top management team members vary across 
titles. For example, research has found that CEOs are primary instigators (31.9 percent) 
and primary financial beneficiaries (42.5 percent) of accounting manipulations (Feng et 
al., 2011). But, CFOs are not primary instigators (17.5 percent) or primary financial 
beneficiaries (7.5 percent) of accounting manipulations (Feng et al., 2011). Indirect 
archival evidence leads Feng et al. (2011) to conclude that CFO involvement in 
accounting manipulations is more likely to be due to CEO pressure rather than personal 
financial benefits to the CFO. 
 Various types of pressures create stress within accountants and affect their 
attitudes and performance (see DeZoort & Lord, 1997 for a review). Drawing from the 
social psychology literature, the behavioral accounting literature has examined the 
organizational-related pressures faced by individuals in firms, including three types of 
social influence pressure (obedience, compliance, and conformity). Two types of social 
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influence pressure involve pressure from superiors: obedience pressure and compliance 
pressure. Under these pressures, the supervisor’s influence comes in the form of either a 
directive (obedience pressure) or a request (compliance pressure) to engage in an act. 
Conformity pressure results from pressure to act in accordance with one’s peers in order 
to avoid appearing different. 
 The present study seeks to better understand accounting manipulation through the 
scenario of CEOs as leaders and CFOs as followers through a leadership and 
organizational behavior research lens. Some individuals are predisposed to intentional 
dishonesty as a result of attitude, character, or ethics, while other individuals are able to 
rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Organizational corruption is often explained by a 
combination of rationalization tactics used by individuals to justify their actions and 
socialization tactics used to induce newcomers into accepting the unethical practices as 
normal (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). 
Obedience Pressure 
In an environment in which there is perceived opportunity to commit fraud, 
obedience theory may enrich our understanding of the potential pressures and 
rationalizations that motivate individuals to commit fraudulent acts. Obedience pressure 
is a form of social influence pressure where individuals are compelled to submit to an 
order from an authority figure. Of the three social pressures, obedience pressure typically 
is most potent because of the power a hierarchical supervisor holds over an employee. 
Thus, CEO pressure can result in a great deal of stress, particularly regarding the 




The significant influence of legitimate authorities can override individual 
predispositions (Blass, 1991; Milgram, 1963). Legitimate power arises from one’s 
hierarchical position in the organization and depends on the willingness of subordinates 
to defer to demands (French & Raven, 1959). While obeying the directives of authorities 
such as parents and teachers is beneficial for children because of the authority figures’ 
greater knowledge and their control over rewards and punishments, adults also reap the 
practical advantages of obedience to authority. 
 The origins of obedience theory can be traced to Stanley Milgram’s (1963) 
experiments, which measured participants’ willingness to obey an authority figure 
directing them to apparently administer electric shocks to others, in conflict with their 
personal conscience. Milgram’s study found that participants obeyed more often than 
expected, despite the apparent pain caused by the treatments, leading to the theory that 
obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior that may override ethics or morality 
(Milgram, 2009). 
 In a partial replication of Milgram’s experiment, Burger’s (2009) obedience rates 
were only slightly lower than Milgram’s rates 45 years earlier. Several reasons have been 
advanced for the high rates of obedience (Burger, 2009). First, Milgram’s experiments 
suggested that ordinary people were willing to justify atrocities by claiming that they 
were merely following orders, thus abdicating individual moral responsibility. Second, 
the legitimacy of the authority figure is important, along with the cultural forces that 
compel individuals to obey authority figures. Third, when the intensity of the demands is 
gradually increased, attitudinal and behavioral changes are stronger. Milgram’s 
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experiments also demonstrated the difficulty of translating intentions into actions when 
someone is influenced by pressure (Blass, 1991). 
After decades of broad psychological research, more recent studies have extended 
the obedience concept to the business organization. For example, managers were more 
likely to act unethically or illegally in the workplace when ordered to do so by a 
supervisor than when acting under their own volition (Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007). 
Many participants in recent high profile corporate frauds appeared to be ethical 
employees who quietly went along with activities that were obviously unethical, and then 
neutralized their negative feelings or regrets by denying responsibility for their behaviors 
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). Additionally, obedience pressure significantly 
increased auditors’ willingness to sign off on an account balance that was materially 
misstated (Lord & DeZoort, 2001). 
In terms of the fraud triangle, CEO instigators, lacking opportunity or direct 
access to the financial statements, may pressure CFOs to commit fraud. Obedience 
pressure from the CEO authority figure may be viewed as a potential motivation for 
CFOs under pressure from CEO instigators. At the same time, obedience theory provides 
a potential rationalization for CFOs who act in conflict with their personal beliefs and 
shift responsibility for their actions to the CEO authority figure. In an examination of 
managers’ unethical behavior in 39 high-profile fraud cases, Cohen et al. (2010) 
suggested that managers’ dominant influence or tyrannical/autocratic personalities 




 This study also investigates the influence of another social influence pressure, 
compliance pressure, on CFO financial reporting behavior. Compliance pressure refers to 
an individual’s acquiescence in response to an explicit or implicit request (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998) from either a peer or superior (DeZoort & Lord, 1997). Thus, the primary 
distinction between the two types of social influence pressures lies in how the influence 
attempt is framed – as a request (compliance) or a demand (obedience). In organizations, 
compliance pressure includes both overt requests, as well as requests from unspoken 
pressure inferred from organizational circumstances or the incentive structure (Prentice, 
2007). 
 Target individuals may have various underlying reasons for accepting or adopting 
the influence of others, including gaining rewards or approval and avoiding punishment 
or disapproval. Frequently, individuals who acquiesce to compliance pressure publicly 
agree while privately dissenting. Thus, compliance can occur even when the requested 
behavior is incongruent with the target’s value system, and even when the target does not 
believe in, accept, or internalize the content (Kelman, 1958; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 
2000). For example, in situations involving initial disagreement between the source and 
the target, Nail (1986) distinguishes between two types of conformity behavior: 
conversion (publicly and privately agreeing with the source’s position) and compliance 
(publicly agreeing but privately continuing to disagree). 
 Accountants who are asked to inappropriately change their actions face stress-
inducing compliance pressure. Pressure from a superior is particularly stressful for a 
subordinate, particularly regarding the potential negative impact on job and career 
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(DeZoort & Lord, 1994; DeZoort & Lord, 1997). For example, supervisor requests to 
underreport time were found to have significant explanatory power regarding subordinate 
auditors’ underreporting behavior (Lightner, Adams, & Lightner, 1982; Sweeney, 
Arnold, & Pierce, 2010).  
Followership Theory  
 Interviews with prosecutors and defense attorneys led Bucy et al. (2008) to 
conclude that participants in fraudulent schemes are classified as either leaders or 
followers, with different personality profiles and motives attributed to each group. 
Additionally, followers can be separated into ineffective followers (whose actions clearly 
have negative implications for their organization) and effective followers (independent, 
critical thinkers whose creativity, innovation, and courage result in positive implications 
for their organizations) (Kelley, 1992). The role of ineffective followers is important in 
understanding financial statement fraud because collusion among top management team 
(TMT) members is frequently a component of fraud schemes. Furthermore, Feng et al.’s 
(2011) research supports the scenario of CEO instigators pressuring CFO followers. On 
the other hand, practitioner literature offers examples of effective follower behavior, 
noting that heroic followers effectively check the power of toxic leadership (Bennis, 
2010) by thinking independently (Kelley, 1992) and acting courageously (Chaleff, 2003).  
 In an early attempt to classify followers, Zaleznik (1965) differentiated followers 
based on their level of dominance vs. submissiveness and activity vs. passivity. The four 
resulting groups were labeled impulsive, compulsive, masochistic, and withdrawn. Later, 
Kelley (1988, 1992) identified five types of followers (effective, alienated, yes-people, 
sheep, and survivors) according to their levels of critical independent thinking and 
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activity level. In a related typology, Chaleff (2003) classified followers based on the level 
of support given to the leader and the willingness to challenge the leader on critical 
issues. The four resulting typologies are partner, implementer, individualist, and resource 
followers. Chaleff highlights the importance of “the courageous follower” in strongly 
supporting leaders, but challenging them if necessary. A review of the foregoing 
typologies indicates that the activity level criterion is an important classification factor in 
the practitioner literature, particularly in Zaleznik (1965) and Kelley (1988, 1992).  
 Kelley’s (1992) five types of followers are classified based on their degree of 
independence and activity. Four of the five types of followers are deemed to be 
ineffective or less than advantageous. The least effective, sheep, wander in herds waiting 
for the leader’s instructions. Yes-people are also considered ineffective. Although they 
are more active than sheep, they still depend on the leader and tell the leader what they 
believe the leader wants to hear. Alienated followers are ineffective due to passivity. 
They may think critically, but because they remain passive, they do not act on their 
opinions. Pragmatic followers act based on political expediency or on the system’s 
bureaucrats, and keep their ideas to themselves.  
 Kelley’s exemplary followers exercise independent critical thinking, evaluate 
leadership’s requests, and balance their own ideas as well as those of the leader with the 
organization’s goals and objectives. Kelley developed seven steps for acting as an 
exemplary follower: (1) be proactive, (2) gather the facts, (3) seek wise counsel, (4) play 
by the rules, (5) persuade by speaking the organization’s language, (6) have the courage 
to go over heads when necessary, and (7) take collective action or be prepared to stand 
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alone (Kelley, 1998). Kelley’s seven steps give common sense recommendations for 
courageously offering dissenting opinions to a leader (Corrothers, 2009). 
 Chaleff’s (2003) four-quadrant model for followership mirrors Kelley’s model on 
many points; however, it recognizes positive attributes in each category. For example, in 
place of Kelley’s “sheep,” Chaleff’s “resource followers” work honestly, but not beyond 
the minimum. Chaleff’s “partners” correspond with Kelley’s “exemplary” followers. 
Partners support the leader vigorously, but are willing to question the leader’s behavior if 
necessary.  
Follower-Centered Approach 
 The discussion above provides a historical account of the underpinnings of 
followership. This section describes how the focus of research on followers has 
developed over time. Until recently, the leadership literature has primarily been leader-
focused, emphasizing the perspectives of the leader and largely ignoring the follower’s 
perspectives (Kellerman, 2007). Beginning in the 1990s with Meindl’s (1995) 
propositions, a follower-centered approach to leadership has explored how follower traits 
influence the leadership process (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009) and contribute to 
a richer understanding of leadership (Sy, 2010). The growing interest in followership 
recognizes that the complexity of organizational dynamics (a) demands an exploration of 
the role of followers (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001), (b) examines follower-based 
approaches to leadership (Shamir, 2007), and (c) considers the follower to be the primary 
focus (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The “romance of leadership” notion highlights the 
potential bias toward the importance of leaders in organizations (Meindl, Ehrlich, & 
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Dukerich, 1985) and urges an emphasis on followers and their interaction with leaders 
(Meindl, 1995).  
The Social Construction of Followership 
 After reviewing the evolution of the construct of followership from a historical 
perspective, it is important to explore the interactions of followers with others in an 
organizational setting. The roles of leaders and followers in an organization, by 
definition, involve an imbalance of authority or a difference in status. Followers appear to 
develop cognitive schemas over time regarding appropriate or inappropriate behavioral 
norms or role behaviors to guide their actions in followership roles. Followership 
behavior involves some degree of deference to the leader (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007), 
varying from passive to proactive followership (Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & 
McGregor, 2010). Thus, followers appear to have schemas of followership ranging from 
subordination and obedience to partnership and co-leadership (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; 
Shamir, 2007). Individuals employ context-specific schemas depending on their position 
in the organization and leadership contexts in the social construction process. Implicit 
leadership theories (ILTs) and implicit followership theories (IFTs) represent dynamic 
classifications of prototypical leadership and followership behavior that both leaders and 
followers use as a basis for their organizational interaction with each other (Shondrick & 
Lord, 2010). The identities of leaders and followers mutually impact each other, with 
characters that shift within contexts (Collinson, 2006).  
Core Self-Evaluations  
 For several decades researchers have investigated how executives’ demographic 
and psychological characteristics are manifested in their behaviors, especially when they 
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have a high degree of discretion (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The premise of this “upper-
echelons” research stream is that the personal demographic and psychological 
characteristics of senior executives influence their choices in various organizational 
settings. Previously, researchers have evaluated various measures of executive’s self-
concepts, including narcissism, hubris, and overconfidence. Recent psychological 
research has focused on the more comprehensive concept of core self-evaluations (CSE) 
to concisely measure an individual’s self-assessment. Hiller and Hamrick (2005) 
proposed applying CSE to executive settings. 
 Judge, Locke, and Durham (1997) developed and validated CSE, a stable 
personality trait that describes the “fundamental, bottom-line evaluations that individuals 
hold about themselves, the world, and others” and subconsciously influences their 
perceptions and behavior (Bono & Judge, 2003). CSE, a broad latent concept that 
assesses an individual’s perceptions of self-worth, is composed of at least four specific 
traits: self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and emotional stability (neuroticism). It 
has been found to be a significant dispositional predictor of job satisfaction and job 
performance (Judge & Bono, 2001). Research suggests that high CSE individuals work 
more effectively in teams (Zhang & Peterson, 2011) and are more likely to achieve 
economic success (Judge & Hurst, 2007). Additionally, CSE has been shown to have a 
moderating effect on individual reactions to organizational social stressors (Harris, 
Harvey, & Kacmar, 2009). Three of CSE’s four component traits have been investigated 




 This study investigates how CFOs’ followership propensity and core self-
evaluations influence decision-making in conditions of CEO social influence pressure to 
misstate financial statements. I predict that social influence pressure will increase CFOs’ 
propensity to revise an estimate and will lead CFOs to assign responsibility for their 
actions to the CEO. I also expect the CFO’s level of followership to influence behavior, 
such that the positive relationship between social influence pressure and CFO revision is 
stronger when follower effectiveness is lower. Similarly, I expect CSEs to influence 
CFOs’ behavior, such that the positive relationship between social influence pressure and 
CFO revision is stronger when CSE is lower. Below, I formally develop these 
expectations. 
Several recent financial statement frauds involve pressure from CEOs on 
subordinates to manipulate financial statements in conflict with GAAP in order to support 
stock prices (Donegan & Ganon, 2008). For instance, Betty Vinson, a midlevel 
accountant, reported enormous guilt and fear throughout the unrelenting pressure from 
her bosses to make false accounting entries at WorldCom (Pulliam, 2003). Similarly, 
Qwest’s CEO, Joseph Nacchio, exerted extreme pressure on subordinates to achieve 
targets, paying bonuses if targets were met and threatening consequences if they were not 
(SEC, 2005).  
A common motivation in many recent high-profile frauds was management’s 
desire to meet earnings forecasts (Beasley et al., 2010). For instance, the SEC alleged that 
HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy instructed senior officers to match analysts’ 
expectations in order to maintain the stock’s market price, and to “fix it” by recording 
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false earnings to make up any shortfall (SEC, 2003). Likewise, when Enron’s top 
executives realized they were going to miss the number they had promised Wall Street, 
they desperately scrambled to “fill the holes” in the company’s earnings (McLean & 
Elkind, 2004). Clearly, top management pressure to meet earnings targets by adjusting 
earnings has relevance in the accounting literature, as well as in actual fraud cases. 
Considerable research investigates the influence of CEO equity incentives on firm 
performance and accounting irregularities. For example, stock-option based 
compensation is positively associated with CEO self-interested behavior, including the 
likelihood of managing corporate earnings upward (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2005; 
Burns & Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007), meeting or beating 
earnings targets (Cheng & Warfield, 2005), and committing accounting fraud (Johnson, 
Ryan, & Tian, 2009). 
Despite the numerous examples of accountants succumbing to pressure from 
CEOs, a review of accounting research uncovers only a small body of literature 
concerning the susceptibility of accountants to social influence pressure. In a public 
accounting firm setting, auditors were found to be susceptible to obedience pressure 
when receiving inappropriate instructions from a superior (DeZoort & Lord, 1994; Lord 
& DeZoort, 2001). Additionally, in experiments with management accountants, the 
likelihood of violating explicit policy and creating budgetary slack increased when 
subjects were faced with obedience pressure from an immediate superior (Davis, 
DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006; Hartmann & Maas, 2010).  
Compliance pressure from superiors influences auditors’ intention to engage in 
dysfunctional behaviors. For example, supervisors’ requests to underreport time were 
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found to have significant explanatory power regarding subordinate auditors’ 
underreporting behavior (Lightner, Adams, & Lightner, 1982; Sweeney, Arnold, & 
Pierce, 2010). 
 Two studies examine the behavior of accountants under pressure leading to 
financial statement manipulation. First, using student subjects, Baird and Zelin (2009) 
found that pressure to obey supervisors overpowers an individual’s tendency to act 
ethically, increasing an individual’s likelihood of participating in financial statement 
fraud. Second, in a firm-level examination into causes of accounting manipulations, Feng 
et al. (2011) provided indirect archival evidence on the effect of pressures from superiors 
by suggesting that CFOs manipulate financial statements as a result of pressure from 
CEOs rather than from an attempt to acquire immediate personal gain. I extend this 
research, by examining specific types of pressure, using CFO subjects and the following 
hypotheses, which draw on the limited accounting literature and the more extensive 
social psychology literature: 
H1a:  CFOs under obedience pressure from the CEO to meet an earnings target 
will report higher earnings (by recording a smaller final inventory 
adjustment) than will CFOs under no obedience pressure.  
 
H1b:  CFOs under compliance pressure from the CEO to meet an earnings target 
will report higher earnings (by recording a smaller final inventory 
adjustment) than will CFOs under no compliance pressure.  
 
 Obedience theory, developed from Milgram’s series of studies, states that under 
obedience pressure, target subordinates break from an autonomous state, become agents 
for the authoritative source, and tend to deny responsibility (Milgram, 1963). The concept 
of individuals shifting responsibility for their actions is a central tenet of obedience 
theory (Burger, 2009). Milgram’s (1963) experiments suggested that ordinary people 
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were willing to justify unethical behavior by claiming that they were merely following 
orders, thus abdicating individual moral responsibility. Thus, obedience pressure links 
two areas of the fraud triangle, pressure and rationalization. Additionally, obedience 
pressure offers an explanation for a perplexing question in the arena of white-collar 
crime: why seemingly “good” people, with moral convictions and a clean record, would 
commit “bad” acts (Baird & Zelin, 2009). In accordance with obedience theory’s 
responsibility shifting prediction, accountants who violated corporate policy found 
themselves less responsible for their actions than did participants who refused to follow 
inappropriate directives from the authority figure (Davis, DeZoort, & Kopp, 2006). 
However, recent SOX 302 certification requirements were designed and implemented to 
strengthen CFOs’ sense of responsibility for the financial statements. Such policy 
enhancements introduce tension into the question of whether CFOs would be similarly 
motivated to abdicate responsibility to their CEO and offer an opportunity to incorporate 
such policy-related effects into the obedience theory literature. Thus, the current study 
uses obedience theory to motivate the responsibility-shifting hypothesis in a scenario of 
significant interest to policy makers.   
 I am not aware of any research investigating the degree to which individuals 
under compliance pressure hold themselves less responsible for their actions. However, 
in a setting in which the superior (as opposed to a peer) makes the request for 
compliance, I expect the presence of an authority figure to result in a similar 
responsibility shifting effect due to the power the supervisor holds over the subordinate. 
Therefore, in accordance with obedience theory’s key component of responsibility 
shifting, suggesting that individuals who succumb to obedience pressure will feel less 
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responsible for their decision and will be more likely to assign responsibility for their 
actions to their superior in comparison to individuals who resist pressure, I hypothesize 
the following:  
H2a:  CFOs who revise their initial inventory judgments under obedience 
pressure will find themselves less responsible for the decision than CFOs 
who do not revise their inventory judgments under obedience pressure. 
 
H2b:  CFOs who revise their initial inventory judgments under compliance 
pressure will find themselves less responsible for the decision than CFOs 
who do not revise their inventory judgments under compliance pressure. 
Social influence pressure literature posits that obedience pressure is the most 
potent type of social influence pressure because of the power a hierarchical supervisor 
holds over an employee. Pressure from a superior produces a great deal of stress in the 
subordinate, particularly regarding the potential negative impact on job and career 
(DeZoort & Lord, 1994, 1997). Obedience pressure is an order from a hierarchical 
superior to a subordinate target. In contrast, compliance pressure is a request from a 
colleague at any level. Thus, obedience pressure’s strength lies in a combination factors, 
including the hierarchical nature of the relationship (superior to subordinate) and the way 
the influence attempt is framed (order rather than request).   
In another line of research exploring management’s power and influence in 
organizations, Raven and his colleagues have developed, refined, and expanded a social 
power taxonomy. French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1965) typology of the bases of 
social power or tactics (e.g., legitimate, coercive, reward, referent, expert, and 
informational) describes the types of power found in supervisor-subordinate 
relationships. In their initial work (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965), social influence 
was described as a target’s change in attitude, belief, or behavior that results from the 
actions of an influencing agent. Individuals in positions of power can choose from a 
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variety of power tactics when attempting to influence others (e.g., reward power promises 
compensation in return for compliance, whereas coercive power threatens punishment in 
order to gain compliance). Raven (1992) expanded the taxonomy to include 14 bases of 
power and developed the power interaction model (see Elias, 2008 for a review) to 
provide a theoretical framework for examining the antecedents and outcomes associated 
with social power choice. 
Subsequently, the soft-harsh classification (Koslowsky & Schwarzwald, 2001; 
Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998) has been used to explore the use of power. 
Harsh (or positional) tactics rely on the influencing agent’s status and are threatening in 
that they are forceful and direct. In contrast, soft (or personal) tactics tend to be more 
subtle and positive by relying on the influencing agent’s personal assets and using 
collaboration or socializing. Thus, when classifying pressure types based on the 
influencing strategy utilized, obedience pressure is a harsh tactic because it involves 
hierarchy-based legitimate power (Raven et al., 1998) and compliance pressure is a soft 
tactic. 
 The influencing agent’s choice of power tactics utilized to influence and gain 
compliance is situationally contingent. For example, higher status individuals utilized a 
greater variety of power tactics in conflict situations (Koslowsky & Schwarzwald, 1993), 
harsh tactics usage was associated with environments where routine tasks predominated 
(Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Ochana-Levin, 2004), and harsh tactics met with greater 
resistance from subordinates who perceived their supervisor as possessing similar 
knowledge and experience (Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 2001). When choosing 
power tactics to influence CFO targets, the foregoing discussion suggests that CEO 
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influencing agents are likely to use a variety of tactics due to their higher status. 
Additionally, given the more complicated nature of the situations, CEOs may avoid harsh 
tactic usage. Finally, since CFOs are likely to perceive the CEO’s experience and 
knowledge in financial matters as similar to their own or even less (less power distance), 
if harsh tactics were used, CFO subordinates may react with resistance. As discussed in 
the following pages, subordinates who resist inappropriate influences from superiors are 
not only reflecting their disagreement, but may also be initiating a constructive dialog 
toward a more positive outcome.   
In conclusion, social influence pressure literature predicts that obedience pressure 
is generally the most potent form of social influence pressure. In comparison, Raven’s 
harsh-soft line of research suggests that compliance pressure may be more effective in the 
CEO-CFO context due to the complex situation and the CEO’s lack of superiority in 
financial reporting experience and knowledge in comparison to the CFO. Since the 
preceding arguments suggest alternative effects, I do not make a directional prediction in 
the following hypothesis:   
H3: The amount of earnings adjustment for CFOs under compliance pressure 
will be different than that for CFOs under obedience pressure.  
Followers and Leaders  
 White-collar criminals have been described as generally falling into two groups: 
leaders or followers, with different personality profiles and motives (Bucy et al., 2008). 
Top management team collusion in financial statement fraud schemes necessitates the 
consideration of why certain followers are unwilling or unable to resist the pressures 
exerted by their leaders.  
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 Historically, leadership studies have focused on the effects of exceptional leaders 
on their followers (Bass, 1999; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 
1993). Even though not all authority is just, we are taught from childhood to obey rather 
than to challenge or question authority (Zimbardo, 2009). A dominant authority figure 
who negatively influences subordinates increases the level of unethical behavior (Treviño 
et al., 1998) and is a primary risk factor for fraud (AICPA, 2002). Recent studies 
investigate “destructive leadership” and the toxic triangle: destructive leaders, susceptible 
followers, and conducive environments (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Thoroughgood, 
Hunter, & Sawyer, 2011). 
 Followers’ self-worth may become intertwined with the leader’s vision, and 
unethical charismatic leaders with unilateral power may select or mold obedient or 
dependent followers (Howell & Avolio, 1992). Charismatic leaders are frequently able to 
inspire trust and a “reflexive obedience” in subordinate followers (Zahra, Priem, & 
Rasheed, 2005). Researchers have divided followers into groups of conformers, who 
passively comply whether through fear or reverence, and colluders, who actively 
participate through greed or ego (Padilla et al., 2007). Accountants should create 
environments conducive to good followership (Arlinghaus, 2006).  
 Kelley’s (1992) model of follower behavior suggests that followers from the 
world of accounting “who are conformist (active and dependent, uncritical thinking) and 
passive (passive and dependent, uncritical thinking) would be most prone to be 
influenced by the policies, actions and language of their CEO” (Amernic & Craig, 2010). 
Similarly, in an exploratory qualitative study, Carsten et al. (2010) found that some 
followers are passive, obedient, and deferent, while others view their roles as 
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participative and proactive. Sy (2010) surveyed leaders’ perceptions of follower 
characteristics and developed a followership prototype (industry, enthusiasm, and good 
citizen) and followership antiprototype (conformity, insubordination, and incompetence). 
Sy urged an extension of his research to an examination of followers’ perceptions.  
 Chaleff (2003) urges followers to appropriately exercise resistance or 
“courageous followership” by challenging the leader or voicing constructive criticism and 
dissent. He indicates that courageous followers have the courage to assume 
responsibility, to serve, to challenge, to participate in the transformation, and to take 
moral action. Thus, Chaleff also values active participation among followers and asserts 
that some followers with high activity levels are be more likely to voice dissent against 
inappropriate leader behavior.  
 Typologies provide a parsimonious framework for describing complex processes 
and consistent patterns among constructs “that should be subjected to quantitative 
modeling and rigorous empirical testing” (Doty & Glick, 1994). Typologies have been 
used to explain charismatic (Trice & Beyer, 1993) and transformational (Tichy & 
Devanna, 1986) leadership.  
 Of the primary practitioner typologies described above, only Kelley (1992) 
provides a published instrument by which followers can be assessed and categorized. 
Kelley’s scale provides a grounded means of analysis for follower effectiveness 
(according to levels of critical independent thinking and activity level), and coupled with 
Kelley’s typology provides a means to predict variance among constructs (Doty & Glick, 




H4:  Followership will moderate the relationship between social influence 
pressure and CFO financial statement revision, such that the positive 
relationship between social influence pressure and CFO financial 
statement revision is stronger when follower effectiveness is lower. 
 
 Core Self-Evaluations 
 Effective transformational leaders engage and mobilize followers by articulating a 
vision and incorporating followers into the vision. Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) 
suggest that successful charismatic leaders match their vision with followers’ existing 
goals and individual self-concepts. Thus, certain follower personality or behavioral 
characteristics may moderate the effect of leadership on outcomes. For instance, in a 
meta-analysis of 136 behavioral ethics studies, Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño 
(2010) investigated the antecedents of unethical decision making in organizations, 
including individual characteristics. Their results indicated that individuals who obey the 
authority figures are lower in cognitive moral development, are Machiavellian, and have 
an external locus of control.  
 The core self-evaluations (CSE) (Judge et al., 2003) construct is designed to 
measure the appraisals people make of their overall value; their capabilities in controlling 
their life; their competence in performing, coping, and succeeding; and their general 
belief that their life will turn out well. CSE is a relatively new construct indicated by the 
following traits: self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism (i.e., 
emotional stability). 
 CSE’s four component traits are among the most frequently studied in the 
psychology literature. For example, Hinrichs (2007) proposed that low self-efficacy 
followers (who believe they lack leadership capability or potential) are more likely to 
defer moral responsibility to the leader and to view leaders as having more responsibility 
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in decision-making. Additionally, prior research suggests follower self-esteem is related 
to both organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and deviant workplace behavior 
(DWB) (Avey, Palanski, & Walumbwa, 2011).  
 In a setting in which a hierarchical superior exerts social influence pressure, I 
expect a target individual’s level of resistance to be influenced by their self-esteem, self-
efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability. Specifically, individuals high in CSE 
feel confident, competent, and successful. Additionally, they feel capable of coping with 
problems, in control of their own success, and able to determine their own destiny. This 
discussion suggests the following hypothesis:  
H5:  CSE will moderate the relationship between social influence pressure and 
CFO revision, such that the positive relationship between social influence 










To evaluate pressure’s effect on financial reporting decisions, the participants 
completed an experimental task (provided in the Appendix) involving social influence 
pressure from the CEO to engage in earnings manipulation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three pressure treatment groups: a control group receiving no 
pressure, an obedience pressure group (i.e., demand from a superior), and a compliance 
pressure group (i.e., request from a superior).   
 After completing the experimental task, the participants in each treatment group 
completed a brief followership questionnaire and a CSE instrument to assess whether 
their individual personality characteristics influenced their level of intention to revision 
their estimate (these are not included in the Appendix). Finally, participants completed a 
series of questions that will be used as a manipulation check and to collect demographic 
information about the participants.    
Design 
 The study’s three-level design involved an experiment with three types of social 
influence pressure manipulated randomly between subjects: a control group receiving no 
pressure, an obedience pressure group (i.e., demand from a superior), and a compliance 
pressure group (i.e., request from a superior). Participants in each of the three pressure 
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treatment groups were evaluated based upon their scores on Kelley’s (1992) 20-item 
followership questionnaire and the 12-item Judge et al. (2003) Core Self-Evaluations 
Scale (CSE).  
Research Instrument  
 The instrument provided the participants with a financial reporting case involving 
a CFO’s earnings manipulation decision under three types of CEO pressure. The case 
materials and vignette are partially derived from previous research (DeZoort, Hermanson, 
& Houston, 2003a, 2003b; Libby & Kinney, 2000). The vignette described a “gray” or 
ambiguous earnings management scenario, and involved a CFO’s decision regarding 
whether to meet an earnings target by manipulating the amount of an inventory 
adjustment. 
 Participants assumed the role of CPAs employed as CFOs for a mid-size publicly 
traded company that manufactures and distributes cellular telephone accessories to 
retailers. First, participants were presented with the financial information, including 
estimated year-end balances for the current year, pretax earnings per share (EPS) as 
currently stated of $1.10 per share, and the consensus analysts’ EPS forecast of $1.08 per 
share. Next, the participants were presented with an inventory obsolescence issue for 
their consideration. A competitor’s newly introduced product is expected to reduce 
demand and services for one of their products, necessitating an inventory write-down to 
net realizable value. Participants were told that their tentatively proposed adjustment 
would reduce pretax EPS from $1.10 to $1.06. Ultimately, the participants were given the 




 Social influence pressure (PRESSURE) was manipulated at three types based on 
statements made by the CFO’s immediate supervisor, the company’s CEO, during a 
meeting to discuss the year-end financial results. Participants in the control group (no 
pressure condition) were assured “that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is 
yours to make”. In the obedience pressure condition, the CFO received pressure to 
engage in earnings management from the CEO who emphasized the extreme importance 
of meeting short-term earnings estimates – and explicitly tells the CFO to change the 
tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target. In the compliance 
pressure condition, the CFO again received pressure from the CEO, but rather than a 
directive, the pressure is in the form of a request – the CEO asks the CFO to change the 
tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target. 
Dependent Measures 
Revision of an Inventory Adjustment Decision   
 The vignette involved professional judgment regarding a CFO’s decision in 
response to CEO pressure to change an accounting estimate (i.e., to revise their initial 
inventory adjustment recommendation to meet an earnings target). After reading the 
background information regarding a financial reporting decision, the participants’ 
propensity to revise was assessed using a three-item measure. First, participants were 
asked to indicate “the likely final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS you would 
record” with endpoints of “$1.06, your initial adjustment” and “$1.10, EPS before any 
adjustment” (REVISION). The decision to revise enough to meet an earnings target 
(move from $1.06 to the analysts’ forecast of $1.08 of EPS) is less than 2% of pretax 
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EPS, but it is qualitatively material according to Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 
Materiality (SEC, 1999) since it means the difference between meeting or missing an 
earnings target.     
 Next, participants were asked about actions of a typical or average CFO in an 
attempt to obtain more unbiased responses to questions regarding sensitive subjects such 
as potential accounting fraud (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1996). In addition to asking the 
participants to indicate the “final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS you would 
record”, I also asked subjects to indicate the “final inventory adjustment and pretax EPS 
that a typical public company CFO would record in this situation”. This additional 
question was intended to control for the potential “social desirability” or “halo” effect in 
business ethics cases measuring behavioral intention (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993) and to 
eliminate potential bias induced by vanity (Milgram, 2009). Additionally, I avoided 
value-laden language in the case and questions by asking participants for an honest 
assessment of an adjustment, without labeling the adjustment as fraudulent, aggressive, or 
manipulative. I also included language in the case indicating that the adjustment involved 
considerable judgment and subjectivity. 
 Participants were asked to briefly explain their decision with the following open-
ended questions: Please list at least two primary reasons in order of importance for your 
decision (and a typical public company CFO’s decision) in this situation. Participants’ 
responses provided a richer understanding and additional insight into the potential 
rationalizations and responsibility shifting associated with participants’ judgments. 
Finally, the participants were asked to estimate the percentage of typical CFOs who 





 Participants were asked to “assign responsibility for your final inventory 
adjustment” using a 100-point allocation method between themselves (the CFO), their 
superior (the CEO), and others. This assessment indicated the degree to which 
participants accept responsibility themselves or assign responsibility for their decision to 
the authority figure. Participants were also asked the following open-ended question: 
“Please indicate the reasons for your decision above regarding allocating responsibility 
for the final inventory adjustment among the CFO (you), the CEO (Chris), or others”.  
Other Measures 
Manipulation Check 
 To determine whether the participants interpreted the study’s experimental 
manipulation in the intended way, the instrument included a multiple-choice question 
regarding the CEO’s communication regarding the final inventory adjustment. 
Specifically, participants were asked whether the CEO said that the inventory write-down 
decision was “yours to make” (no pressure), “asked you to please change your proposed 
inventory write-down” (compliance pressure) or “told you to change your proposed 
inventory write-down” (obedience pressure). (See discussion in the Results section 
regarding the wording of this question and its revision in the second mailing.) 
Perceptions of the Case  
 Participants were asked a series of questions to assess the understandability and 
realism of the case. To obtain the participants’ perceptions of the degree of ethical 
conflict in the case and the ethicality of the proposed action, participants were asked, “If 
the situation described in this case were real, how much pressure would you feel to record 
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a smaller final inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million tentative adjustment)?”; 
and “In this case, do you believe it is unethical for the CFO to record a smaller final 
inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million tentative adjustment)?”. To assess 
participants’ views regarding the legality of the case scenario, participants were asked, 
“In this case, do you believe it is illegal for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory 
adjustment (smaller than the $2 million initial adjustment)?”. In addition, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they have ever actually been pressured by anyone to 
improperly manipulate the financial statements.  
Whistleblowing 
 To assess the likelihood of whistleblowing in the experimental situation, 
following Davis et al. (2006), the obedience [compliance] treatment groups were asked, 
“If you were faced with this situation in practice, how likely would you be to report the 
CEO’s order [request] telling [asking] you to ‘go back and fix this now so that we meet 
our target’”? Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the party to whom they 
would most likely report.  
Demographic and Company Variables 
 Demographic control variables included age, gender, education, job title, 
professional experience, and professional certification. Company characteristics included 
the company’s industry and size in revenue. 
Moderator Variables 
Followership 
 Based on the followership questionnaire, participants were evaluated as to their 
level of followership (FOLLOWERSHIP) based on Kelley’s (1992) 20-question 
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followership questionnaire which includes two dimensions: activity level (10 items) and 
propensity for independent thinking (10 items). Kelley’s instrument utilizes a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1-Rarely, 4-Occasionally, to 7-Almost Always (Kelley uses a 
0-6 scale, while I coded the scale from 1 to 7). Similarly, the current study measures the 
CFOs’ self-reported frequencies utilizing a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-
Rarely, 4-Occasionally, to 7-Almost Always. Kelly’s effective followers score high on 
both activity level and independent thinking. Thus, follower effectiveness increases as 
both activity level (10 to 70 in the current study) and independent thinking (10 to 70 in 
the current study) increase, ultimately creating a continuous variable measuring 
followership (20 to 140 in the current study).      
 This instrument included 10 questions to assess activity level and 10 questions to 
assess level of independent thinking. Example items are, “Do you take the initiative to 
seek out and successfully complete assignments that go above and beyond your job?”; 
“Do you independently think up and champion new ideas that will contribute 
significantly to the leader’s or the organization’s goals?”; and “Do you assert your views 
on important issues even though it might mean conflict with your group or reprisals from 
the leader?”  
Core Self-Evaluations 
  Core Self-Evaluations (CSE) were assessed with the 12-item Judge et al. (2003) 
core self-evaluations instrument. The instrument measured participants’ responses 
utilizing a five-point Likert scale with endpoints of 1-Strongly disagree and 5-Strongly 
agree. Example items are, “When I try, I generally succeed.”; “Overall, I am satisfied 
with myself.”; and “I am capable of coping with most of my problems.” Based on the 
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results of the instrument, participants were evaluated as to their level of CSE. This 
instrument has six reverse-coded items. CSE increases as scores increase, producing a 
continuous variable ranging from 12 to 60 (Tsaousis, Nikolaou, Serdaris, & Judge, 2007). 
A recent review of 15 years of CSE research found general support for CSE’s internal 
consistency, reliability and validity (Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012).           
 The items for the 20-question followership questionnaire and 12-item core self-
evaluations scale were included in the instrument. Cronbach’s alpha is used to explore the 
internal consistency of the scales as applied to the CFO sample. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of .835 for the followership scale and .828 for the CSE scale are well above 
the recommended level of .70 (Hair et al., 2010).  
Because the study’s data are collected using a self-report measure in a single 
instrument, the possibility of common methods bias must be addressed (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). The research instrument was carefully designed in 
an attempt to minimize the potential sources of common method variance. Additionally, 
Harman’s single-factor test is used to diagnose the extent of any potential threats to 
internal validity. The results of Harman’s single-factor test do not indicate a problem 
resulting from common methods bias. An exploratory factor analysis with the study’s 
variables reveals that no single factor accounts for more than 29% of the variance (well 
under the 50% level for concern). 
Model 
Based on the discussion above, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model is 
used to examine the effects of pressure on the inventory adjustment decision and test 
hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5. The complete model is:  
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REVISION =  f (PRESSURE, FOLLOWERSHIP, CSE, PRESSURE X 
FOLLOWERSHIP, PRESSURE X CSE, ACCTEXP) 
PRESSURE has three levels (1 = no pressure, 2 = compliance pressure, and 3 = 
obedience pressure). FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE are measured as continuous variables 
from 20 to 140 and 12 to 60, respectively. ACCTEXP (the natural log of each CFO’s 
accounting experience) is a control variable.  
Pretesting 
 The primary focus of the case materials was to evaluate professionals’ propensity 
to revise their accounting estimate and their susceptibility to pressure. Given the sensitive 
nature of the research focus and the fact that respondents were drawn from the top 
management team, particular care was taken with the design and administration of the 
research instrument. The materials were developed with reference to previously 
published research (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Libby and Kinney, 2000) and reviewed 
by a panel of experts active in the accounting behavioral ethics area for realism, 
relevance, accuracy, and internal consistency. Additionally, the questionnaire was pilot 
tested with a small group of graduate accounting students and with a few individuals with 
previous CFO experience. The instrument was revised based on this feedback.  
Participants      
 A total of one hundred twenty one (121) U.S. public company CFOs participated 
in the study. Participants were drawn from an Audit Analytics pool of public company 
CFOs appointed or reappointed between 1/1/2005 to 6/30/2012 to serve companies with 
revenues greater than $0 but less than $2 billion. After eliminating 196 addresses in non-
English speaking countries, the CFO sample was randomly selected from the Audit 
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Analytics pool of the 2,238 most recently appointed CFOs in companies matching the 
revenue and date criteria. The case materials were mailed via USPS priority mail to 635 
CFOs. Each packet included a personalized letter on the university’s color letterhead, a 
hand-stamped return envelope, a hand-written note encouraging participation, and the 
incentive of a charitable contribution to the charity of their choice (Dillman, 2009). 
Sixteen packages were returned due to insufficient addresses and resent after obtaining 
better addresses. Second requests were sent four weeks after the initial mailing. A total of 
121 CFOs responded, for a response rate of 20% based on the adjusted sample size of 
607 (there were 28 sets of undeliverable materials).  
The 20% response rate is quite good when compared to other recent CFO studies, 
particularly unsponsored studies (studies without a sponsoring professional organization). 
For example, a study mailed to public company CFOs drawn from the Compact 
Disclosure database yielded a 7% response rate (Gillett & Uddin, 2005). The 15.1% 
response rate from CFOs in Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio (2007) was described as the 
highest response rate to date for a Financial Executives Institute (FEI)-sponsored study. 
In a recent email study co-sponsored by CFO Magazine and Duke University, 5.4% of 
the CFOs responded (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2012). Audit committee 
studies sponsored by large accounting firms (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008) 
have typically drawn response rates of approximately 20%, but similar studies without 









DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Manipulation Check and Related Issues 
 A manipulation check question was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
manipulation in the case instrument. In the first mailing, participants were asked to, 
“Indicate your judgment as to the degree of pressure on the CFO to make a smaller final 
inventory adjustment to meet the earnings target”. The response choices were (1) The 
CEO, Chris, said that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours to make, (2) 
The CEO, Chris, asked you to please change your proposed inventory write-down, and 
(3) The CEO, Chris, told you to change your proposed inventory write-down.  
This question was reworded for the second mailing after written comments from 
three respondents indicated confusion over the wording, and based on a lower than 
expected pass rate for the initial mailing (49%). In the second mailing, participants were 
asked, “Which of the following reflects the CEO’s communication to you regarding the 
final inventory adjustment?” The response choices remained the same in the second 
mailing. The participants’ pass rate improved to 78.3% on the second mailing, for an 
overall manipulation check pass rate of 54.5%.1 After eliminating 55 CFOs who failed 
the manipulation check, 66 participants remained for subsequent hypothesis testing.  
                                                
1 The overall manipulation check results are reasonably comparable with prior studies with executive-level 
subjects. For example, in studies of audit committee members, DeZoort et al. (2003a) and DeZoort et al. 





The ANCOVA results for the full sample (n = 117 after excluding those with 
incomplete responses) are not consistent with the results presented in Table 5. For 
example, if participants who failed the manipulation check are included, Model 2 in 
Table 5 is not significant (p = 0.52)2. Thus, the study’s findings hold only when CFOs 
who fail the manipulation check are excluded.   
The only significant demographic or expertise difference between respondents 
failing the manipulation check question and respondents passing the manipulation check 
question was age. Respondents who failed the manipulation check were significantly (p < 
0.01) older (M = 53.11; SD = 7.39) than those who passed (M = 49.24; SD = 6.46).  
 The power of the manipulation (for those passing the manipulation check 
question) also was evaluated with an alternative measure designed to assess the 
participants’ perception of pressure in the case. Specifically, participants were asked, “If 
the situation described in this case were real, how much pressure would you feel to record 
 a smaller final inventory adjustment (smaller than the $2 million initial adjustment)?” on 
a 100-point3 scale with endpoints4 of 0 = “None” and 100 = “A Great Deal”.  
As presented in Table 1, obedience group participants perceived significantly 
more pressure (M = 64.48, SD = 25.75) than members of the control group (M = 39.39, 
                                                
2 All p-values are two-tailed, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
3 Such 100-point scales are common in similar studies in accounting literature (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003a, 
2003b, 2008; Bierstaker et al., 2012). 
 
4 For the instrument’s 100-point graphic rating scales, participants were asked to indicate their responses 
by placing a slash on a ruled line with labeled anchors. Their slash-mark responses were then converted to 
the 0-100 scale based on where the slash crossed the line (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008; Bierstaker et 
al., 2012). However, some respondents indicated their answers with a circle. The circled responses were 
converted to a 0-100 scale based on the center of the circle on the line or based on the value corresponding 
to the circled anchor values if the words were circled.  
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SD = 29.06) and the compliance group (M = 45.00, SD = 30.58) (p = 0.004 and p = 0.030, 
respectively). In contrast, the difference in the perceived pressure of the compliance 
group and the control group was not significant. Thus, the choice of power tactics 
employed by the CEO affected the perception of pressure in participant CFOs. This 
points to the effectiveness of the experimental setting.  
 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics: Perceived pressure (n = 66 CFOs)  
 
Overall n Mean SD  t Sig. t Sig. 
No pressure (control) 23 39.39 29.06  
Compliance pressure 22 45.00 30.58 -.631a .532  
Obedience pressure 21 64.48 25.75 -3.019 a .004 -2.253 b .030  
Total 66 49.24 30.12 
             
a  Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no pressure group.  
b  Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of compliance pressure group.  
 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
Pressure Treatment Groups: 
 No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO. 
 Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the 
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings 
target. 
 Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO 




Participants’ Perceptions of the Case 
 Overall, the participants found the case to be realistic and understandable. Using a 
100-point scale (anchored 0 = “Not at all Realistic” and 100 = “Very Realistic”), the 
participants agreed that the case was realistic (M = 64.64, SD = 26.22). The participants 
also indicated that the case was understandable (M = 88.20, SD = 14.54) on a scale 
anchored 0 = “Not at all Understandable” and 100 = “Very Understandable”). Both 
means are significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001).  
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 Participants’ views as to the ethicality and legality of the experimental setting 
showed more variation (perhaps due to the purposeful selection of a “gray” fact 
situation). The participants had diverse views about whether changing their inventory 
adjustment would be unethical. When asked, “In this case, do you believe it is unethical 
for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory adjustment?”, the mean response of 46.71 
(SD = 32.02) was not significantly different than the midpoint of 50 on a scale anchored 0 
= “Completely Unethical” and 100 = “Completely Ethical”. However, 20 respondents’ 
responses were < 25 and 17 respondents’ responses were > 75. The CFO participants 
indicated that recording the inventory adjustment would not be illegal when asked, “In 
this case, do you believe it is illegal for the CFO to record a smaller final inventory 
adjustment?” The participants’ mean response of 63.92 (SD = 33.14) on a 100-point scale 
anchored 0 = “Completely Illegal” and 100 = “Completely Legal” was significantly 
greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p = 0.001).  
There were no significant differences in responses to the ethicality and legality 
questions between pressure groups (p > 0.050 in all cases). However, the 40 CFOs who 
did not change their initial adjustment felt such a change was significantly (p = 0.001) 
more unethical (M = 36.85; SD = 27.67) than the 26 CFOs who ultimately changed their 
recommended adjustment in the case (M = 61.88; SD = 32.81). Participants showed 
similar differences in their judgment as to the legality of the situation. The CFOs who did 
not change their recommended adjustment in the case viewed the prospect of making 
such a change to be significantly (p = 0.02) more illegal (M = 56.33; SD = 31.96) than the 
CFOs who did not change their recommendation (M = 75.62; SD = 32.07).   
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 Participants were also asked if they had “ever actually been pressured by anyone 
to improperly manipulate the financial statements”. Sixteen (24.2%) of the CFOs 
reported experiencing improper pressure. The CEO was identified as the source of the 
pressure in 62.5% of such cases. The prevalence of actual improper pressure from CEOs 
reinforces anecdotal evidence from high-profile fraud cases and confirms the importance 
of the topic. 
Participants subjected to pressure in the hypothetical case expressed mixed 
feelings toward whistleblowing. When asked about the likelihood that that they would 
report an improper request (or order) to “go back and fix this now so that we meet our 
target” (on a 100-point scale anchored 0 = “Very Unlikely” and 100 = “Very Likely”) the 
mean response of 45.47 (SD = 34.14) was not significantly different than the indifference 
midpoint of 50. Participants’ responses reflected strong feelings at both extremes. Almost 
half (41.8%) of the responses were less than 25, and nearly one-third of the responses 
were greater than 75 (30.2%). There were no significant differences in responses between 
pressure groups or between participants who revised their recommended adjustment and 
those who did not.    
Respondent Demographics 
 
 Table 2 presents demographic information for the 66 CFOs (participants are 
collectively referred to as CFOs, although one participant is identified as a controller). A 
majority of the participants were CPAs (81.8%) with public accounting experience  
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(84.8%). Most of the participant CFOs (89.4%) were male and between the ages of 40 
and 59 (86.3%). Thirty-nine percent of the participants have a graduate degree. 
Participants possessed a mean of 5.7 years of experience in their current position and 20.6 
years of accounting experience. In a majority of the cases, the CFO’s current company 
operated in a non-regulated industry (74.2%) and reported total revenue less than $250 
million (59.1%). In summary, the participants’ demographics indicate that they possess 
the ability and expertise required to complete the research materials and render a 
judgment in a complex accounting situation.  
 Additionally, when compared to the 5,055 CFOs in the subset of the Audit 
Analytics database from which they were drawn, the respondents were similar in age and 
size of company of employment (see Table 2), suggesting that the sample is 
representative of the Audit Analytics population of CFOs on certain dimensions.  
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TABLE 2.  Participant demographics (n = 66 CFOs) 
 Variable Number Percent 
  
Title 
 CFO 65 98.5% 
 Controller 1 1.5% 
CFO age a 
 Under 40 5 7.6% 
 40-49 28 42.4% 
 50-59 29 43.9% 
 60 or over 4 6.1% 
CFO gender 
 Male 59 89.4%  
 Female 7 10.6% 
CFO education  
 Bachelors 40 60.6% 
 Masters 24 36.4% 
 JD 1 1.5% 
 PhD/DBA 1 1.5% 
CFOs with CPA certification 54 81.8% 
CFOs with public accounting experience  56 84.8% 
Annual revenue of CFO’s current company a 
 Under $250 million 39 59.1%  
 $250 – $499 million  10 15.2% 
 $500 – $999 million 10 15.2% 
 $1 billion and over 7 10.6% 
Industry of current company b 
 Non-regulated industry 49 74.2% 
 Regulated industry 15 22.7% 
 No response 2 3.0% 
 
   Mean SD 
Years of experience  
 Current position 5.7 4.2 
 Accounting  20.6 10.2 
             
a Means for CFOs in the subset of the Audit Analytics database are as follows: CFO age (46.9) and annual 
company revenue ($339 million). 








Descriptive Results for REVISION   
The descriptive results for the dependent variable, REVISION, by pressure 
treatment are presented in Table 3. The results in Panel A present the CFO’s propensity 
to revise an estimate in response to CEO pressure to meet an earnings target (i.e., to 
revise the initial inventory adjustment recommendation to meet an earnings target). 
Specifically, the mean results reflect the degree to which CFOs are willing to change 
their initial estimate on a scale of 0 (the CFO’s initial adjustment of $2 million or $1.06 
EPS; i.e., no change to the CFO’s initial estimate) to 100 (an adjustment of $0 or $1.10 
EPS; i.e., CFO changes his/her estimate to $0). Thus, higher values of REVISION 
indicate greater acquiescence to the CEO’s pressure in the pressure conditions (and 
greater reductions of the CFO’s initial inventory adjustment). The midpoint of 50 
represents the CEO’s desired adjustment (an adjustment of $1 million or $1.08 EPS; i.e., 
a change to meet the analysts’ forecast). Panel B presents the results measured by the 
actual dollar amount of the CFO’s inventory adjustment revision (i.e., a scale of $0 of 




Table 3.  Descriptive statistics: Pressure effects on inventory adjustment revisions 
(REVISION) (n = 66 CFOs)  
 
Pressure treatment group n 
 Mean 
(0-100) 











Panel A: Means using 0-100 scale  
(0 = $2 million final adjustment [no revision], 100 = $0 final adjustment [complete revision]) 
  
No pressure (control) 23 4.91 14.39  
Compliance pressure 22 21.05 31.89 -2.171a  .038  
Obedience pressure 21 18.67  27.35 -2.059 a .048  .262 b .795 
Total 66 14.67 26.10   
 
Pressure treatment group n 
  
Mean 
   ($) 
   
   SD 
   ($) 
Final adjustment 
     % Participants assigning    
$2M      $2M<x<$1M      <$1M 
 
 
Panel B: Means using $ size of downward revision 
No pressure (control) 23 $98,200 $287,800 83% 9% 9% 
Compliance pressure 22 $421,000 $637,800 50% 23% 27% 
Obedience pressure 21 $373,400 $547,000 48% 33% 19% 
Total 66 $293,400 $522,000 61% 21% 18% 
             
a  Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no pressure group.  
b  Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of compliance pressure group.  
 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
Pressure Treatment Groups: 
 No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO. 
 Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the 
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings 
target. 
 Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO 




 The pressure-related hypotheses predicted that CFOs under social influence 
pressure from the CEO would be more likely to make revisions to their estimates than 
CFOs under no pressure. Specifically, Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that obedience 
pressure and compliance pressure would influence CFOs’ inventory adjustments (i.e., 
CFOs would report higher earnings by recording a smaller final inventory adjustment). 
Consistent with H1a and H1b, the results in Table 3 show that CFOs’ mean inventory 
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revisions for the compliance and obedience pressure groups (M = 21.05 and 18.67, 
respectively) are significantly higher than the mean inventory revision of 4.91 (p < 0.038 
and p < 0.048, respectively) for the control group under no such pressure.   
Hypothesis 3 predicted that CFO judgments under compliance pressure would be 
different than CFO judgments under obedience pressure, with no prediction as to the 
direction of the difference. However, there was not a significant difference in CFO 
response under compliance versus obedience pressure (p = 0.795), inconsistent with 
hypothesis 3. Thus, the revisions of CFOs subjected to compliance pressure were similar 
to the revisions of CFOs under obedience pressure. This result is interesting when 
considered in light of the participants’ reported levels of perceived pressure (see Table 1 
above). CFOs under compliance pressure indicated low levels of perceived pressure, 
similar to the control group and significantly less than the obedience group. Taken 
together, the perceived pressure and revision results suggest that although compliance 
pressure does not create perceived pressure, it generates an actual response (REVISION) 
similar to obedience pressure.  
Responses by pressure treatment group (Panel B) reveal significant differences in 
the proportion of participants willing to revise their initial adjustment so as to meet the 
analysts’ forecast (make an inventory adjustment of $1 million or less). Only two 
participants (9%) in the control group made such an adjustment. In contrast, six (27%) of 
the compliance group participants and four (19%) of the obedience pressure group 




Table 4 provides descriptive results for the moderator and control variables (i.e., 
followership, CSE, and accounting experience). The results are categorized according to 
the degree to which CFOs ultimately revised their inventory adjustment in response to 
CEO pressure (i.e., no pressure, no acquiescence, zone of compromise, and total 
acquiescence). The means appear quite similar across groups, and t-tests reveal no 
significant differences (p > 0.05). These relations are further explored in the ANCOVA 
testing below. 
 
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics: Moderator and control variables (n = 66 CFOs)  
 
Pressure response group                                      FOLLOWERSHIP CSF           CSE ACCTEXP 
  
 Mean 115.41 3.99 21.00 
No pressure (control) SD 11.09 .47 10.24 
 n 23 23 23 
  
 Mean 119.43 3.95 21.81 
Pressure, but no acquiescence SD 8.88 .53 9.36  
 ($2M) n 21 21 21 
 
 Mean 120.50 4.06 23.08  
Pressure and Zone of Compromise SD 7.38 .51 8.73 
 ($2M<x<$1M) n 12 12 12 
 
 Mean 115.10 3.88 14.40 
Pressure and total acquiescence SD 11.23 .55 12.17 
 (<$1M) n 10 10 10 
 
       
 
Pressure Response Groups: 
 No pressure (control) group: participants were not subjected to pressure treatment. 
 No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment 
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.   
 Zone of compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million, but not to $1 million as demanded or requested by the CEO.   
 Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.   
Variable Definitions: 
 FOLLOWERSHIP = total score on the 20-item Followership questionnaire, with each item measured 
on 7-point scale (possible total score range 20 - 140);  
 CSE = total score on the 12-item Core Self Evaluations scale, with each item 
measured on a 5-point scale (possible total score range 12 - 60); and  





 An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model is used to examine the effects of 
pressure on the inventory adjustment decision and test hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 (see 
subsequent section for testing of H2). The complete model is shown below:  
REVISION =  f (PRESSURE, FOLLOWERSHIP, CSE, PRESSURE X 
FOLLOWERSHIP, PRESSURE X CSE, ACCTEXP) 
 PRESSURE has three levels (1 = no pressure, 2 = compliance pressure, and 3 = 
obedience pressure).5 FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE are measured as continuous variables 
from 20 to 140 and 12 to 60, respectively. ACCTEXP (the natural log of each CFO’s 
accounting experience) is a control variable.6 Previous research indicates that a CFO’s 
number of years of experience is positively associated with earnings quality (Aier et al., 
2005). Additional potential control variables were added to the model, one at a time – 
age, gender, education, professional certification, years in current position, years of 
public accounting experience, annual revenue of current company, and industry 
(regulated or not). None of these was significantly related to REVISION (p > 0.05). 
 The ANCOVA results for H1, H3, H4 and H5 are presented in Table 5. Model 1 
includes only the manipulated variable (PRESSURE), Model 2 adds the moderator 
variables (FOLLOWERSHIP and CSE) and control variable (ACCTEXP), and Model 3 
adds the interactions (PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP and PRESSURE X CSE) to 
                                                
5 When PRESSURE is converted to a dummy variable (0 = no pressure, 1 = pressure), Model 2 results in 
Table 5 are similar and PRESSURE is significant at p < 0.01.   
6 Substituting raw accounting experience for the natural log of each CFO’s accounting experience in Model 
2 in Table 5 produces similar results (ACCTEXP has p = 0.001).  
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allow for testing of H4 and H5. Results from Model 1 provide some support for the 
influence of PRESSURE on REVISION (F = 2.64; p = 0.080).  
Model 2 is significant (F = 3.34; p = 0.010), and adjusted R2 improves from 4.8% 
in Model 1 to 15.2% in Model 2. The results also indicate that PRESSURE (F = 3.64; p = 
0.032), FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 5.70; p = 0.020), and ACCTEXP (F = 6.38; p = 0.014) 
are significantly related to REVISION.7, 8 Specifically, pressure from the CEO increases 
the CFOs’ propensity to revise, as expected in H1 (see the contrast testing below for 
further analysis of this effect and specific insights into H1 and H3). Effective followers 
(who score higher on the followership scale) are less likely to revise their inventory 
adjustment. Thus, the Model 2 results indicate a direct effect for followership in resisting 
improper CEO pressure. Likewise, CFOs with more accounting experience make smaller 
revisions (i.e., provide lower inventory revisions) to their accounting estimates under 
pressure, highlighting the importance of accounting experience in resisting CEO pressure. 
The ANCOVA results indicate that CSE is not significant (F = 1.35; p = 0.250).9, 10 
                                                
7 In Model 2, the inventory adjustment recommendations for CFOs who had previously experienced 
inappropriate pressure were not significantly different (p = 0.148) than the recommendations of participants 
who had no such experience. 
8 Including the participants’ views regarding the ethicality and legality of the case as control variables (one 
at a time) in Model 2 yields similar results for PRESSURE and FOLLOWERSHIP (ethicality and legality 
have p < 0.001), but ACCEXP is then only marginally significant (p = 0.078 and p = 0.063, respectively). 
9 The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test provides evidence of heteroskedasticity. As a result, the 
REVISION data was converted to ranks in order to perform a non-parametric sensitivity test (e.g., Conover, 
1980). The ANCOVA on ranks provides similar results (F = 3.11; p = 0.015), but ACCTEXP is no longer 
significant (F = 2.61; p = 0.111). 
 
10 There is a strong, positive correlation between CSE and FOLLOWERSHIP (r = .52; p = 0.01). To assess 
possible multicollinearity, I ran the model as a regression (replacing the three-level PRESSURE variable 
with two dummy variables, COMPLIANCE and OBEDIENCE). Both COMPLIANCE and OBEDIENCE 
are significant (p < 0.03), and the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.47, well below the standard 
criterion of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue.  
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Model 3 examines H4 and H5 by including the interaction effects for followership 
and CSE; each variable interacted with PRESSURE. Hypothesis 4 and 5 predicted that 
the positive relationship between social influence pressure and CFO revision would be 
stronger when follower effectiveness and CSE are lower, respectively. Model 3 is 
significant (F = 2.41; p = 0.022). However, PRESSURE (F = 2.12; p = 0.130) and 
FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 1.65; p = 0.205) are no longer significant (see comments below 
regarding the statistical power of this model). The model’s interaction terms, PRESSURE 
X FOLLOWERSHIP (F = 2.15; p = 0.126) and PRESSURE X CSE (F = 0.24; p = 
0.784), are not significant.11 Therefore H4 and H5 are not supported. ACCTEXP is the 
only variable that remains significant (F = 2.15; p = 0.012).  
Given the changes to the significance of variables with the addition of the 
interaction terms in Model 3, it is appropriate to assess the power of the models. 
Observed power for the overall model, which is adequate (Hair et al., 2010) in both 
models as shown in Table 5, increased from .872 in Model 2 to .880 in Model 3. 
However, observed power for the PRESSURE variable decreased from .650 in Model 2 
to .416 in Model 3. The FOLLOWERSHIP variable had similar drop in power from .652 
to .243. In summary, the addition of the interaction terms in Model 3 hurts the model’s 
power and produces insignificant results.12  
                                                
11 The interaction terms in Model 3 also are insignificant if they are included in the model one at a time. 
CSE also is insignificant in Model 2 when each variable is included in the model one at a time. 
12 Supplemental analysis was conducted in order to assess whether the sample size affected the sensitivity 
(power) of the results. Sample doubling yields highly significant results for both Model 2 (F = 7.01; p < 
0.001) and Model 3 (F = 5.26; p < 0.001). Additionally, PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP becomes 
significant (F = 4.68; p < 0.011). This suggests that the insignificant findings for H4 reflect small sample 
size rather than small effect size. This sample size effect is present despite sample cell sizes of greater than 
the recommended 20 per cell (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
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The effect size for each of the models is presented in Table 5. Specifically, 
Cohen’s f = .348 for Model 2, indicating an effect size between medium (.25) and large 
(.40) (UCLA, 2013a).  
 
 
Table 5.  ANCOVA results for REVISION a (n = 66 CFOs)  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable F p  F p  F p 
PRESSURE  (H1, H3) 2.64 0.080  3.64 0.032  2.12 0.130 
FOLLOWERSHIP    5.70 0.020  1.65 0.204 
CSE    1.35 0.250  0.77 0.384 
PRESSURE X FOLLOWERSHIP  (H4)       2.15 0.126 
PRESSURE X CSE  (H5)       0.25 0.784 
ACCTEXP    6.38 0.014  6.76 0.012 
         
Model 2.64 0.080  3.34 0.010  2.41 0.022 
 
 
Adj. R2  4.8%   15.2%   16.4% 
Effect size – Cohen’s f c  .289   .348   .275 
Observed Power - Model b 
Observed Power - PRESSURE c 
 .506 
.506 
  .872 
.650 
  .880 
.416 
 
a  The dependent variable measures the CFOs’ willingness to revise their initial inventory recommendation 
on a scale of 0 = no change from CFO’s initial recommendation of $2 million to 100 = revise adjustment 
to $0, with a midpoint of 50 = revise adjustment to $1 million to meet earnings target.  
b Partial eta squared.    
c Computed using alpha = .05. 
 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
Variable Definitions: 
 PRESSURE =  manipulated variable (1 = control 2 = compliance, or 3 = obedience); 
 FOLLOWERSHIP = total score on the 20-item Followership questionnaire, with each item measured 
on 7-point scale (possible total score range 20 - 140);  
 CSE = total score on the 12-item Core Self Evaluations scale, with each item 
measured on a 5-point scale (possible total score range 12 - 60); and  




Contrast Testing  
 In order to directly test H1 and H3, planned contrast tests are run (UCLA, 2013b). 
Table 6 presents the results for contrast testing based on Model 2 (using Model 3 yields 
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similar results). As predicted, the planned contrast test results in Table 6 reveal 
significant differences (p < 0.05) between the no pressure and obedience pressure groups 
(H1a) and no pressure and compliance pressure groups (H1b). Although not specifically 
hypothesized, the planned contrast test results also reveal a significant (p = 0.014) 
difference between the no pressure condition and the average of obedience and 
compliance pressure conditions. The planned contrasts reveal no significant difference (p 
= 0.654) between the obedience versus compliance pressure conditions (H3). Overall, the 
contrast testing results provide support for H1a and H1b, but not H3. 
 
 
Table 6.  Results of hypothesis testing: Pressure effects on REVISION a 
(Planned contrasts testing based on Model 2 above) 
 
Pressure effects                        CSF                  F                    p-value  
 
Tests of contrasts of individual treatments  
No pressure versus obedience pressure (H1a)  3.06 0.043* 
No pressure versus compliance pressure (H1b) 4.71 0.017* 
Obedience versus compliance pressure (H3)  0.20 0.654 
No pressure versus average of obedience and compliance  5.07 0.014* 
       
 
a  “*” denotes a one-tailed p-value, reflecting the directional prediction in H1a and H1b. The other p-value 




Inventory Adjustment Decision Justifications  
 Participants were asked to furnish primary justifications for their inventory 
adjustment decisions. Table 7 summarizes the CFOs’ explanations, grouped by their 
degree of acquiescence to social influence pressure. Panel A provides the primary 
justifications from CFOs who complied with the CEO’s directive/request and 
recommended an inventory adjustment of $1 million or less in order to meet an earnings 
target. A review of the responses for the 10 participants who acquiesced totally indicates 
56 
	  
that most (n = 8) considered the inventory adjustment issue to be subjective or 
immaterial. Additionally, several participants felt that it was either too early to tell (n = 2) 
or that the original recommendation should be reviewed or it was incomplete (n = 2). In 
summary, these CFOs argued that the materiality, subjectivity, or uncertainty of loss 
justified postponing an adjustment to inventory.  
 Panel B provides the primary justifications from the CFOs who recommended a 
compromise inventory adjustment amount less than their original recommendation but 
greater than the CEO’s directive/request. Similar to the CFOs who acquiesced in Panel A, 
some CFOs who compromised felt the original recommendation was incomplete and 
should be reviewed (n = 5) or the issue was subjective or immaterial (n = 3). This 
similarity is because some CFOs only acquiesced a very small amount (i.e., REVISE < 6 
in five cases). Other participants provided justifications more aligned with the views of 
CFOs who did not acquiesce at all (i.e., Panel C) by explaining that their initial 
recommendation was supported by the evidence (n = 3) and that it is not appropriate to 
manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecasts (n = 3). 
 Approximately half (n = 21) of the CFOs refused to change their initial inventory 
adjustment recommendation at all despite pressure from the CEO (Panel C). The majority 
of these CFOs (n = 12) indicated that their original recommendations were supported by 
the evidence. Other respondents stated that it is not appropriate to manage earnings or 
make decisions based on analysts’ forecasts (n = 7). Five CFOs explained that the CEO 
did not offer substantive evidence to support reconsideration, while four CFOs were 




Table 7.  Justification for revision decision (n = 66 CFOs)  
 
# Justification     n 
 
Panel A:  Total Acquiescence Under Pressure 
 (n = 10 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $1 million or more) 
  
1.  Original estimate is subjective or not material   8 
2.  It is too early to tell. Give it another quarter and consider other factors 2 
3. Original recommendation was incomplete and should be reviewed  2 
 
 
Panel B:  Zone of Compromise Under Pressure 
 (n = 12 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $0 < x < $1 million) 
  
1.  Original recommendation was incomplete and should be reviewed   5 
2.  I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence 3 
3. It is not appropriate to manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecast  3 
4. Original estimate is subjective or not material  3 
 
 
Panel C:  No Acquiescence Under Pressure 
 (n = 21 with change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $0)  
  
1.  I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence   12 
2.  It is not appropriate to manage earnings or make decisions based on analysts’ forecast 7 
3. CEO did not offer substantive evidence to support reconsideration  5 
4. Personal integrity or certification expectations  4 
 
 
Panel D:  No Pressure Group 
 (n = 23 with mean change to inventory adjustment recommendation = $98,000)  
  
1.  I am confident that my initial recommendation is supported by evidence   13 
2.  Industry/product/or technology factors dictate treatment 8 
3. Adjustment is appropriate under GAAP/SOX 404/SEC/ required disclosure  5 
 
Most of the 66 participants provided multiple reasons for their inventory adjustment decision.   
              
 
Pressure Response Groups: 
 Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.   
 Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the 
CEO.    
 No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment 
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.  





their initial recommendation highlighted their confidence in their original evidence-based 
decision and their perception that the CEO’s directive/request was not evidence-based. 
They were also influenced by their personal integrity and their views regarding earnings 
management.   
 Panel D summarizes the viewpoints of CFOs who were not pressured by the CEO. 
Many of the members of the control group also mentioned that they were confident that 
their initial recommendation was supported by the evidence (n = 13). Other CFOs felt 
that the issue should be guided by either industry or technology factors (n = 8) or by 
regulatory or standard-setting body requirements (n = 5). Clearly, without the influence 
of social pressure, these CFOs saw the issue as a technical or accounting issue rather than 
a subjective or multi-dimensional judgment.   
Additional Analyses 
 Participants were asked two questions to assess their perceptions of how typical 
CFOs would respond in a similar situation. The results provide some evidence of a halo 
effect. First, participants’ mean inventory adjustment amount for a typical CFO (M = 
33.00; SD = 29.86) was greater than their self-assessed mean inventory adjustment (M = 
14.67; SD = 26.10). Such difference (M = 18.75; SD = 26.06) was significantly greater 
than zero (p < 0.001). Additionally, participants indicated that almost half (M = 44.05; 
SD = 30.17) of typical public company CFOs would acquiesce completely and “make a 
small enough final inventory adjustment to result in pretax EPS of $1.08 or more” 
(untabulated). In contrast, the participants’ responses in Table 3 reveal that only 18% of 
the participants indicated that they would completely acquiesce. There were no 
significant differences between the pressure groups.  
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 Table 8 presents the participants’ perceptions of a typical CFO’s mean inventory 
adjustment (M = 33.00; SD = 29.86) organized first by pressure treatment group and then 
by pressure response group. In the Panel A results by pressure treatment group, the means 
for the no pressure (M = 26.17; SD = 23.82), compliance (M = 36.86; SD = 32.40) and 
obedience group participants (M = 36.79; SD = 33.31) are all significantly higher than the 
CFOs’ mean responses to the question calling for their own inventory adjustment 
recommendation (p < 0.001; p < 0.01; and p < 0.05, respectively). 
 Panel B, Table 8 presents the results for the typical CFOs question organized by 
response group. The overall mean response (M = 33.00; SD = 29.86) reflects the CFOs’ 
judgment as to a typical public company CFO’s inventory revision decision. The typical 
CFO’s mean inventory adjustment for CFOs who completely acquiesced to pressure from 
the CEO (M = 69.22) was significantly higher (p < 0.001 and p < 0.003, respectively) 
than the means for CFOs who did not acquiesce and who compromised (M = 25.90 and 
31.18, respectively). In contrast, the mean for the CFOs who compromised (M = 31.18) 
was not significantly different (p = 0.627) than the mean for CFOs who did not acquiesce 
(M = 30.69). Thus, the results indicate differences among both pressure treatment groups 
and pressure response groups in their perceptions of the actions of typical CFOs.13 
                                                
13 Several prior ethics studies (e.g., Cohen et al., 1993; Lord & DeZoort, 2001) also provide evidence of 
self-presentation effects (participants view themselves as less likely to revise in comparison to their peers). 




Table 8.  Descriptive statistics: Typical CFO’s inventory revision (n = 64)  
 
Pressure treatment group n 
 Mean 
(0-100) 











Panel A: Means of supplemental question regarding typical CFOs by treatment group. 
  
No pressure (control) 23 26.17 23.82 -4.281 b  .000  
Compliance pressure 22 36.86 32.40 -3.183 b .004  
Obedience pressure 19 36.79  33.31 -2.594 b  .018    
Total 64 a 33.00 29.86 -5.796 b .000   
  
Pressure response group     n              Mean             SD   t                  Sig         t                 Sig 
 
Panel B: Means of supplemental question regarding typical CFOs by response group. 
 
No pressure 23 26.17 23.82   
No acquiescence 21 25.90 30.69    
Zone of Compromise 11 31.18 24.84 -.491 c .627  
Total acquiescence  9 69.22 24.25 -3.750 c .001 -3.444 d .003 
Total 64 a 33.00 29.86    
             
a  Two CFOs declined to comment on the actions of typical CFOs. 
b  Paired-samples t-test comparing group mean of supplementary question regarding typical CFO’s decision 
with primary question calling for their decision.  
c   Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of no acquiescence group.  
d   Independent-samples t-test comparing group mean with mean of zone of compromise group. 
 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
Pressure Treatment Groups: 
 No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO. 
 Compliance pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a request – the 
CEO asks the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings 
target. 
 Obedience pressure group: Group received pressure from the CEO in the form of a demand – the CEO 
tells the CFO to change the tentative inventory adjustment so as to meet the earnings target. 
 
Pressure Response Groups: 
 Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million to $1 million or less in response to a demand or request by the CEO.   
 Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the 
CEO.    
 No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment 
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.  






Responsibility Assessment  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that CFOs who revise their initial inventory estimate 
under pressure would find themselves less responsible for their decision than CFOs who 
do not revise. The responsibility results in Table 9 do not support H2.14 In fact, the 10 
CFOs who acquiesced to the CEO’s demand/request assigned directionally more 
responsibility to themselves in comparison to the other groups, rather than less as 
expected. Thus, although the results contradict obedience theory’s responsibility shifting 
prediction, they provide support for Schlenker et al.’s (1994) responsibility theory, which 
suggests that perceived responsibility is a function of an individual’s connection to and 
identification with a set of policies or standards. As discussed in the subsequent section, 
the CFOs’ primary rationalization for assigning primary responsibility was their view of 
the CFO’s duties and responsibilities as principal accounting officer and the SOX 302 
certification requirements. 
                                                
14 One respondent’s allocation percentage was changed to reflect his/her clear intention based on the 
written response to the open-ended question regarding responsibility (see Table 10). Specifically, the 
responsibility allocation of one respondent who wrote, “ultimately, I am responsible” and “the number 
should be up to me” was changed from 10% CFO and 80% CEO to 80% CFO and 10% CEO in order to 




Table 9.  Responsibility assessment:  % of responsibility assigned to CFO, CEO, or 
others (n = 66) a 
 
Pressure response group                                          CFO CSF     CEO    Other b 
 
 Mean 69.3 18.9 11.7  
No pressure SD 23.8 16.0 14.9 
 N 23 23 23 
 
 Mean 83.3 9.5 7.1   
No acquiescence SD 25.2 18.2 16.1 
 N 21 21 21  
 
 Mean 85.4 11.3 3.3   
Zone of compromise SD 15.3 15.4 6.5 
 N 12 12 12 
  
 Mean 86.5 8.0 5.5 
Total acquiescence SD 18.6 11.1 9.6 
 N 10 10 10 
             
a  The percentages above reflect the CFOs’ assessment of responsibility for the inventory revision decision 
when asked to allocate responsibility to the CFO, CEO, or other. 
b  Most (78.9%) of the nineteen CFOs who allocated a portion of the responsibility to someone other than 
the CFO or CEO identified the controller, COO, or sales/marketing director.  
 
Pressure Response Groups: 
 No pressure: Control group with no obedience or compliance pressure from the CEO. 
 No acquiescence group: participants refused to change their initial inventory adjustment 
recommendation of $2 million despite a demand or request by the CEO.  
 Zone of Compromise group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 
$2 million, but by an amount less than the $1 million change demanded or requested by the 
CEO.    
 Total acquiescence group: participants changed their initial inventory adjustment recommendation of 




The results in Table 10 summarize the CFOs’ responses to an open-ended 
question asking the CFOs to, “Indicate the reason for your decision above regarding 
allocating responsibility for the final adjustment.” The results indicate that the recent 
SOX certification requirements offer one potential explanation as to why CFOs who 
acquiesce to pressure might continue to hold themselves 100% responsible for the 
decision. Panel A provides the primary justifications from CFOs who assigned 100% of 
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the responsibility for the inventory adjustment decision to the CFO. A review of the 
CFOs who accepted all of the responsibility (n = 28) indicates that they were guided 
primarily by their view of their responsibility for the financial statements, including the 
SOX Section 302 certification requirements. They indicated that the primary reason for 
their allocation was the CFO’s ultimate responsibility for the financials as the principal 
accounting officer (n = 20). Additionally, participants were guided by their analysis or 
the accounting standards (n = 5) or by their SOX certification responsibilities (n = 4).  
Panel B provides the primary justifications from the CFOs who assigned at least 
75%, but less than 100%, of the responsibility for the inventory adjustment decision to 
the CFO (n = 18). Like the CFOs who assigned 100% in Panel A, some CFOs in this 
group assigned ultimate responsibility for financial information to the CFO as principal 
accounting officer (n = 13). Others in this group also assigned responsibility to the CEO. 
For example, five CFOs felt that since the CEO and CFO both certify the financials under 
SOX, they should share responsibility. Five others indicated that the CEO should be 
consulted in such decisions based on his/her operating knowledge.   
Panel C summarizes the views of the CFOs who assigned less than 75% of the 
responsibility to the CFO (n = 20). Again, many CFOs in this group mentioned that the 
CFO’s role as principal accounting officer was an important factor in their responsibility 
assessment (n = 6). Many of the group also felt that the CEO and other company officers 
should also be assigned responsibility. Six CFOs in this group indicated that the primary 
officers of company should be assigned collective responsibility for the decision. Five 




Table 10.  Justification for responsibility assessment (n = 66 CFOs) 
 
# Justification     n 
 
Panel A:  CFO fully responsible group  
 (n = 28 with responsibility to CFO = 100%)  
  
1.  CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials   20 
2.  Information/numbers/analysis/accounting standards are basis for the decision 5 
3. CFO certifies under SOX / CFO and CEO both sign, but CFO has ultimate responsibility  4 
 
 
Panel B:  CFO median responsible group 
 (n = 18 with responsibility to CFO = 75% < x < 100%) 
  
1.  CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials   13 
2.  CEO and CFO both sign under SOX so responsibility is shared 5 
3. CFO primarily responsible but should consult with CEO due to his operating knowledge  5 
 
 
Panel C:  CFO least responsible group 
 (n = 20 with responsibility to CFO of less than 75%)  
  
1.  CFO as principal accounting officer has ultimate responsibility for financials   6 
2.  Primary officers of company have collective responsibility for decision 6 
3. CFO primarily responsible but should consult with CEO due to his operating knowledge  5 
 
 
Most of the 66 participants provided multiple reasons for their inventory adjustment decision.   
              
 
Responsibility Assessment Groups: 
 CFO fully responsible group: participants assigned 100% of the responsibility for their ultimate 
inventory adjustment decision to the CFO.   
 CFO median responsible group: participants assigned less than 100%, but at least 75% of the 
responsibility for their ultimate inventory adjustment decision to the CFO.   
 CFO least responsible group: participants assigned less than 75% of the responsibility for their 









CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Through an experiment, this study examines the influence of social influence 
pressure on CFO judgments. Consistent with obedience and compliance theory, CEO 
pressure significantly increased the CFOs’ willingness to revise an accounting estimate 
by revising their recommended inventory adjustment. The results also reveal two 
variables that influence the effect of pressure. CFOs with more years of accounting 
experience and CFOs who score high on the effective follower scale are less likely to 
revise their initial adjustment. In contrast, the results did not reveal a significant effect for 
CSE, or any moderating effects of followership or CSE. Interestingly, in contrast to the 
tenets of obedience theory, individuals who acquiesced to the CEO did not hold 
themselves less responsible for their actions than those individuals who did not 
acquiesce.        
This study’s findings have important implications for researchers, practitioners, 
and policymakers. From a research perspective, the study provides insight into the 
strength of social influence pressure on financial statement quality in a top management 
team setting. Specifically, the results highlight the susceptibility of public company CFOs 
to both obedience and compliance pressure. The results suggest that more subtle forms of 
pressure (i.e., compliance pressure) generate a response similar to obedience pressure 
despite a lack of perceived pressure on the part of the CFOs. This study responds to the 
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Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO) call for 
a better understanding of the factors that cause an individual to set aside a personal set of 
beliefs to engage in fraud, including the attitudes and rationalizations that result in the 
decision to engage in fraudulent misreporting, and the psyche of individuals involved in 
fraudulent reporting (Beasley et al., 2010). Additionally, the study’s exploration of 
followership suggests an area for future research.    
From a practitioner standpoint, the study has implications for potential 
improvements to the effectiveness of CFOs as monitors of financial statements. As TMT 
members, CFOs may be in a unique position to “Just Say No” and contribute to the 
monitoring function from the inside by offering thoughtful dissent. Exemplary followers, 
when needed, fulfill an ethical watchdog role (Kelley, 1998; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007). 
From a policy viewpoint, the findings suggest that CFOs’ vulnerability to pressure 
is an important detractor of financial statement quality (confirming Baird and Zelin’s, 
2009, results with a student sample). If CEOs exert undue influence on CFOs, then 
corporate governance policies and practices should be revised to improve CFO 
independence and alleviate the pressure. The study also provides evidence of the high 
level of perceived responsibility on the part of CFOs as a result of such initiatives as SOX 
Section 302 certification requirements. Further improvements to corporate governance 
practices should be adopted, including enhancing audit committee interaction with and/or 
supervision of the CFO position, and encouraging external auditors to proactively 
develop tools to recognize, respond, and potentially alleviate such pressure (by acting as 
an advisor or sounding board to CFOs under pressure).  
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 This study is subject to several limitations. First, there are inherent differences in 
the realism and power found in artificial pressure treatments and a natural setting; real-
world pressures would be more powerful and intense than the case’s experimental setting 
(DeZoort and Lord, 1997). Thus, the case presents a conservative measure of the effect of 
social influence pressure – in this setting, it is costless for the CFOs to ignore pressure 
from the CEO. Second, CFOs are likely to have a wider range of options available when 
encountering pressure than the ones presented in the study. For instance, actual CFO 
decisions may be affected by conversations with colleagues and superiors or adjusted by 
persuading their superior to modify the requested action. Third, the study measures 
participants’ intended behavior (rather than their actual behavior). Although intention 
may predict or infer action (Ajzen, 1991), there still remains a degree of uncertainty 
regarding whether participants would behave differently when faced with the actual 
pressures. Fourth, since this case involves ethical decision-making, it may be particularly 
susceptible to “social desirability” or “halo” effects to the extent that participants may 
respond so as to present themselves more favorably rather than in accordance with their 
true feelings. Although the research design attempted to reduce this bias, it may not have 
completely eliminated such effects. The limitations inherent in the experimental 
condition make the test very conservative and biased against the hypothesized findings. 
Thus, the strength of the results gives support to the importance of the topic. 
 Financial statement misreporting remains an important topic for regulators and 
researchers. Attempts to identify behavioral factors motivating dysfunctional CFO 
activity are in their infancy. I encourage additional research into social influence pressure 
and its effect on CFOs including identifying personality factors that influence reactions to 
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pressure, isolating effective governance measures to support CFO resistance to pressure, 
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Dana R. Hermanson 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise 
Director of Research – Corporate Governance Center 
Kennesaw State University 
dhermans@kennesaw.edu 
770.423.6077 
September 17, 2012 
 
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>> 
<<Position>> 
<<Company>> 
<<Bus Street 1>> 
<<Bus Street 2>> 
<<City>>, <<State>>  <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
As you know, the role of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is quite complex and often challenging. My 
doctoral student, Carol Bishop, is working on her dissertation, in which she is seeking to better understand 
CFOs’ judgments. Dr. Todd DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Carol’s research, 
and we are both experienced accounting researchers who have performed numerous studies sponsored by 
leading accounting and corporate governance organizations. 
 
You are among a select group of CFOs we are contacting to ask for assistance with Carol’s dissertation 
research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain a better 
understanding of the issues and challenges that CFOs confront in practice. We certainly hope you will 
contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area. 
 
We ask that you read the enclosed hypothetical case and respond to all of the questions that follow using 
the directions provided in the case. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We are 
interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link 
you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been approved by 
our Institutional Review Board. 
 
Completion of the case should take approximately 25 minutes, and we will be happy to recognize your 
participation with a contribution to the charity of your choice. If you have any questions or would like to 
receive a summary of the results, please either email Carol at bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu or me at 




Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D. 





Dana R. Hermanson 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise 
Director of Research – Corporate Governance Center 




SECOND REQUEST – October 19, 2012 
 
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>> 
<<Position>> 
<<Company>> 
<<Bus Street 1>> 
<<Bus Street 2>> 
<<City>>, <<State>>  <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
If you responded to our previous mailing in September 2012, thank you very much for your help, and 
please disregard this letter. If you did not respond, we ask that you please consider assisting us with this 
important research by taking approximately 25 minutes to complete the enclosed case. We will conclude 
the data collection by November 20, 2012. 
 
As you know, the role of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is quite complex and often challenging. My 
doctoral student, Carol Bishop, is working on her dissertation, in which she is seeking to better understand 
CFOs’ judgments. Dr. Todd DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Carol’s research, 
and we are both experienced accounting researchers who have performed numerous studies sponsored by 
leading accounting and corporate governance organizations. 
 
You are among a select group of CFOs we are contacting to ask for assistance with Carol’s dissertation 
research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain a better 
understanding of the issues and challenges that CFOs confront in practice. We certainly hope you will 
contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area. 
 
We ask that you read the enclosed hypothetical case and respond to all of the questions that follow using 
the directions provided in the case. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We are 
interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link 
you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been approved by 
our Institutional Review Board. 
 
We will be happy to recognize your participation with a contribution to the charity of your choice. If you 
have any questions or would like to receive a summary of the results, please either email Carol at 
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for your 




Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D. 











This study is part of my research requirement to earn my Doctorate in Business Administration 
(DBA) at Kennesaw State University. The purpose of the study is to gain insight into the 
decision-making processes used by Chief Financial Officers (or similarly titled position).  
 
Your position and expertise make your opinions and evaluations very important to this study. We 
will be happy to make a contribution to the charity of your choice in appreciation for your 
participation. The study consists of a hypothetical case and follow-up questions. The estimated 
time for completion is approximately 25 minutes.  
 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent (or skip 
a question) at any time without penalty. Additionally, your individual results will be anonymous 
(all data will be reported in the aggregate only). There are no known risks involved due to 
participation in this study. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this study.   
 
If you have any questions about the study you can contact me using the information below. 
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the 
oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities 
should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain 
Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (678) 797-2268.  
 













1.  The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case that includes summary background 
information and questions for you to answer.  
 
2.  It is critical that you attempt to put yourself in the following situation as the company’s CFO 
and answer all of the questions as candidly as possible without consulting anyone else. 
 
3.  Please complete the materials/pages in the order given without looking ahead through the 
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that 
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please complete all 
of the questions if possible. You will have an opportunity at the end of the case to provide 
any clarifications or comments you would like to make. 
 
4.  Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your 




Carol C. Bishop, CPA 
Columbus State University 
Doctoral Student - Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University 
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu 






      Dana R. Hermanson (Chair)                 F. Todd DeZoort 
    Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair &   Professor &  
       Professor              Professional Advisory Board Fellow 
        Kennesaw State University     The University of Alabama 
             dhermans@kennesaw.edu                      tdezoort@cba.ua.edu 








Please assume you are a licensed CPA employed as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Ace 
Cellular Telephone, Inc. (ACT) for the past three years. ACT is a mid-size publicly traded 
company that manufactures and distributes cellular telephone accessories to retailers throughout 
the eastern half of the United States. ACT’s management recognizes that heavy competition in 
the industry and frequent technological advances make inventory obsolescence and inventory 
valuation key business and accounting issues.  
 













ACT’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chris Smith, has been with the company for the past five 
years. You report directly to Chris, who completes your performance evaluations and determines 
your annual raises. Since you joined the company, you have had a successful, effective working 
relationship with Chris, with no significant disagreements. As CFO, your current areas of 
responsibility include: financial reporting, investing, capital structure, long-term planning, and 
budget recommendations. In addition, you are responsible for enforcing company-wide fiscal 
policies. 
 
II. Financial Information 
 
ACT is in the fourth quarter of its fiscal year. Relevant estimated year-end balances are presented 
below: 
 
 Sales $650 million  
 Total assets $550 million  
 Inventories $188 million 
 Net earnings $55 million 
  
 Pretax earnings per share (EPS) as currently stated  $1.10 per share 
 Consensus analysts’ pretax EPS forecast $1.08 per share 
 
ACT’s pretax EPS has increased by approximately 6% in each of the last three years, similar to 
the industry average. Consistent with this trend, analysts’ pretax EPS forecast of $1.08 reflects an 
increase of 6% over the previous year’s EPS. ACT’s stock price typically reacts negatively when 
favorable trends in financial results are interrupted.   
 









III. Issue before the CFO 
  
During the fourth quarter of the current fiscal year, one of ACT’s closest competitors introduced a 
product that is technologically superior to and less expensive than similar products currently in 
ACT’s inventory. The competitor’s newly introduced product is likely to reduce the demand and 
sales price for similar products currently in ACT’s inventory.  
 
Based on estimates of future customer demand and sales prices, you have decided to make an 
adjustment to the inventory valuation. You review the following factors to develop an estimate of 
the net realizable value of inventory: a slowdown in new orders, an increase in inventory levels in 
comparison to sales levels, the rapid rate of technological change in the industry, and an 
evaluation of the reliability and technical advantages of the competitor’s new product.  
 
Based on your initial assessment, you tentatively propose to write down inventory by $2 million 
to a net realizable value of $186 million (an adjustment of 1 percent of inventory value). Relative 
to preadjusted balances, your proposed adjustment of $2 million is approximately 3.6 percent of 
pretax income, 0.3 percent of sales, and 0.36 percent of total assets. If your adjustment were made 
in full, pretax EPS would be reduced from $1.10 to $1.06. 
 
After considering the foregoing information, you are comfortable with the reasonableness of this 
initial proposed adjustment (and the resulting revised EPS figure), but you recognize the 
considerable degree of judgment and subjectivity involved in developing the initial adjustment.  
 
Now, you are considering the final adjustment to be recorded. 
 
Control Group (No Pressure) 
 
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results. 
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS 
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris assures you that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours 
to make.   
 
Compliance Pressure from CEO Condition 
 
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results. 
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS 
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris emphasizes the extreme importance of meeting the current year’s 
earnings target of $1.08 and asks you to change your proposed inventory write-down. Chris says, 
“If we make this entry, it will just kill our company. Will you please go back and fix this now so 
that we meet our target?”  
 
Obedience Pressure from CEO Condition 
 
Chris, the company’s CEO, meets with you to discuss the year-end financial reporting results. 
After you explain the effect of your proposed inventory write-down, which would reduce EPS 
from $1.10 to $1.06, Chris emphasizes the extreme importance of meeting the current year’s 
earnings target of $1.08 and tells you to change your proposed inventory write-down. Chris says, 
“If we make this entry, it will just kill our company. I am telling you to go back and fix this now 










1. Based on the information presented, indicate below the likely final inventory adjustment 
and pretax EPS you would record.  
 
 |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| 
      $2 Million Adjustment        $1 Million Adjustment     No Inventory Adjustment         ------------------                            ------------------                              ------------------ 
    $1.06 EPS        $1.08 EPS                    $1.10 EPS        ------------------                             ------------------                              ------------------  
Your Initial Adjustment              Analysts’ Forecast        EPS Before Any Adjustment 
                                      
2.  Please list at least two primary reasons in order of importance for your decision above.   
 
               
               
 
3. How would you assign responsibility for your final inventory adjustment above? 
 
 You (the CFO)    _______% Responsible 
 CEO (Chris)    _______% Responsible 
 Others (please describe)   _______% Responsible 
TOTAL           100 % 
 
4.  Please indicate the reasons for your decision above regarding allocating responsibility for the 
final adjustment among the CFO (you), the CEO (Chris), or others.   
 
            
             
 
5.  Based on the information presented, indicate below the likely final inventory adjustment 
and pretax EPS that a typical public company CFO would record in this situation.  
 
 |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| 
      $2 Million Adjustment        $1 Million Adjustment     No Inventory Adjustment         ------------------                            ------------------                              ------------------ 
    $1.06 EPS        $1.08 EPS                    $1.10 EPS        ------------------                             ------------------                              ------------------  
Your Initial Adjustment              Analysts’ Forecast        EPS Before Any Adjustment 
                             
6.   Please indicate at least two primary reasons in order of importance for a typical public 
company CFO’s decision above.   
 
            
            
  
7. Based on the information provided, what percentage of typical public company CFOs 
would make a small enough final inventory adjustment to result in pretax EPS of $1.08 or 
more?  
    %
Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above. You 
may refer back to the case information when responding. Indicate your answer with a 







1.  In this case, which of the following reflects the CEO's communication to you regarding the 
final inventory adjustment (choose one)? 
 
__  The CEO, Chris, said that ultimately the inventory write-down decision is yours to make. 
__ The CEO, Chris, asked you to please change your proposed inventory write-down. 
__ The CEO, Chris, told you to change your proposed inventory write-down. 
 
2. How realistic do you find this case?               |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
(Indicate with a slash on the line)               Not at all        Very  
               Realistic               Realistic  
 
3. How understandable do you find this case?  |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
           Not at all        Very  
       Understandable    Understandable 
 
4. If the situation described in this case were real,  |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
 how much pressure would you feel to record        None                A Great  
 a smaller final inventory adjustment  (smaller        Deal 
 than the $2 million initial adjustment)? 
 
5. In this case, do you believe it is unethical   |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
for the CFO to record a smaller final         Completely          Completely 
inventory adjustment (smaller than the           Unethical              Ethical 
$2 million initial adjustment)?  
          
6. In this case, do you believe it is illegal   |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
for the CFO to record a smaller final         Completely          Completely 
inventory adjustment (smaller than the            Illegal    Legal 
$2 million initial adjustment)?  
 
7. Have you ever actually been pressured by anyone to improperly manipulate the financial 
statements?  
___  Yes, if yes, by whom (person’s title within the organization)? ________________  
___  No  
 
Compliance (obedience) conditions only 
 
8. If you were faced with this situation in practice |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 
how likely would you be to report  the CEO’s         Very        Very 
request (order) for you to “go back and fix       Unlikely       Likely 
this now so that we meet our target”?   
 
9. If you decided to report the CEO’s request (directive), to whom would you most likely report 
(check only one)?  
___  Board of Directors (as a whole) ___ Internal Auditor      
___  Chairman of the Board  ___ Whistleblower Hotline 
___  Audit Committee ___ Others (please indicate)_____________ 
 ___  External Auditor  









1. What position or title do you hold in your organization (check only one)?  
 ___  CFO  ___  VP of Finance     
 ___  Controller ___  Treasurer 
 ___  Chief Accounting Officer ___  Other    
 
2. How much experience do you have in your current position? ___________ years 
 
3. How much experience have you had in public accounting?  ___________ years 
  
4. How much experience have you had as an accountant? ___________ years 
  
5. Please indicate below any professional certifications you have (check all that apply). 
 ___  Certified Financial Manager (CFM) ___  Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)  
___  Certified Public Accountant (CPA)  ___  Other _____________________ 
___  Certified Management Accountant (CMA)  
   
6. What is your highest educational degree earned (check only one)?  
___  Bachelors     ___  PhD/DBA    
 ___  Masters     ___  Other   
   ___  JD 
 
7. What is your age? ___________ years 
 






1. Please indicate the primary industry in which your company operates: __________________ 
  
2. Please indicate your company’s approximate annual revenue:  
___  Less than $250 million    ___  $500 million to $999 million   
___  $250 to $499 million    ___  $1 billion or more  
 
3. Please provide any additional comments about the issues examined in this case. 
            
             
 
Thank you for your participation. By taking time to share your thoughts and opinions 
about the challenges faced by CFOs, you have contributed to research in this important 
area. If you would like a summary copy of the study’s results, please email the researcher at 
bishop_carol@columbusstate.edu. As a token of appreciation, we will make a contribution to the 
charity of your choice. Please indicate your preference below:  
 
___  American Cancer Society   ___  United Way 
___  American Red Cross   ___  Other _____________________ 




Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to 
analyze the results, not to identify any participant.  
 
Finally, please provide the following information about the company where you are 
currently employed. This information will be used to analyze responses by company 
size and industry. Again, your responses will remain strictly confidential.  
 
